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THE INFLUENCE OF RACE IN SCHOOL 
FINANCE REFORM 
James E. Ryan* 
It would be an exaggeration to say that school finance reform is all 
about race, but largely in the same way that it is an exaggeration to say 
that welfare reform is all about race. Like welfare reform, the contro­
versy generated by school finance litigation and reform has, on the 
surface, little to do with race. Battles over school funding, which have 
been waged in nearly forty state supreme courts and at least as many 
state legislatures, instead appear to be over such issues as the redistri­
bution of resources, retaining local control over education, and the ef­
ficacy of increased expenditures.1 But just as race seems to be an in­
fluential undercurrent in welfare policy and debate, so too does it 
appear to influence school finance litigation and reform. Whereas the 
role of race in welfare reform has been well canvassed,2 the influence 
of race in school finance litigation and reform is virtually unexamined. 
Indeed, the only direct evidence bearing on the topic consists of 
two studies of popular attitudes toward school finance reform, one 
conducted by Professor Douglas Reed in New Jersey and the other by 
Professor Kent Tedin in Texas.3 Both New Jersey and Texas have 
witnessed long court battles over school finance.4 The Reed and 
Tedin studies indicated that white citizens in both states inaccurately 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A. 1988, Yale; 
J.D.1992, University of Virginia. -Ed. Many thanks to Michael Heise, John C. Jeffries, Jr., 
Mike Klarman, Daryl Levinson, and Elizabeth Magill for their helpful comments on earlier 
drafts. Toby Heytens, Mary Kane, and Sue Messenger provided terrific research assistance; 
a special thanks to Darcy Goddard for her indefatigable research and editorial assistance. 
1. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); William A. 
Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 465 (1989) [hereinafter Fischel, 
Did Serrano]; William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 6fr/ 
(1996) [hereinafter Fischel, How Serrano]; Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance "Re· 
fonn" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423 (1991). 
2 See, e.g., EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, AMERICA'S WELFARE STATE 100-11 (1991); 
MICHAEL K. BROWN, RA.CE, MONEY, AND TIIE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 1-29 (1999); 
JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 1900-1994, at 134, 211-23 
(3d ed. 1994). 
3. See Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation 
and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32 L. & Soc'Y REV. 175, 209 (1998); Kent L. 
Tedin, Self-Interest, Symbolic Values, and the Financial Equalization of the Public Schools, 
56 J. POL. 628 (1994). 
4. See infra Section ill.A (discussing school finance litigation in New Jersey and Texas). 
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perceived school finance reform as primarily benefiting blacks.5 
Reed's study also indicated that nonwhites tended to support school 
finance reform more than whites,6 and Tedin's study revealed that the 
level of support among whites depended as much upon racial attitudes 
as it did upon self-interest - e.g., some whites whose school districts 
stood to gain from school finance reform opposed such reform for rea­
sons apparently having to do with their attitudes toward blacks.7 
The Reed study, which involved surveying 800 New Jersey resi­
dents, and the Tedin study, which involved surveying 1,000 Texas resi­
dents, are obviously fairly limited and do not "prove" much of any­
thing. Nonetheless, the studies raise and offer some support for the 
hypothesis that race plays a significant role in school finance reform. I 
believe that hypothesis is true, that it is not well understood, and that 
it carries enormously important implications for school finance reform 
in particular and education reform in general. Indeed, if I am correct 
and race does play an influential role in school finance reform, school 
finance scholars and practitioners should begin paying closer attention 
than they have to the dynamics of race relations and school desegrega­
tion; historians and legal scholars should recognize with added· confi­
dence the wisdom of the NAACP's desegregation strategy; and civil 
rights attorneys, courts, critical race theorists, and conservative critics 
of desegregation should hesitate before abandoning the goal of deseg­
regation. 
I intend to explore the influence of race in school finance reform 
not by following the methodologies of Tedin and Reed and searching 
for further evidence of popular attitudes, but by surveying the history 
and success of minority districts in school finance litigation. Specifi­
cally, this Article examines how predominantly minority districts have 
fared when they have been involved in school finance litigation and 
how legislatures have responded to successful school finance chal­
lenges. Based on my review of the pertinent data, it appears that mi­
nority school districts - particularly urban minority districts - do not 
fare as well as white districts in school finance litigation. More pre­
cisely, minority districts do not win school finance cases nearly as of­
ten as white districts do, and in the few states where minority districts 
have successfully challenged school finance schemes, they have en­
countered legislative recalcitrance that exceeds, in both intensity and 
duration, the legislative resistance that successful white districts have 
faced.8 As this and additional evidence suggests, there are strong rea­
sons to believe that the racial composition of the school district plays 
S. See Reed, supra note 3, at 211-12; Tedin, supra note 3, at 634 n.18, 639 n.27. 
6. See Reed, supra note 3, at 212. 
7. See Tedin, supra note 3, at 638, 646-47. 
8. See discussion infra Parts II & ill. 
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an influential role in determining its success or failure in school fi­
nance litigation and legislative reform. 
As already suggested, this evidence is significant for academic, his­
torical, and practical reasons. First, the evidence offers further proof 
that one must understand the dynamics of race relations and school 
desegregation in order to understand fully the limits and dynamics of 
school finance reform.9 Second, the evidence presented here suggests 
that the principle underlying the NAACP's desegregation strategy -
namely, that green follows white - appears to have been a sound one, 
as the somewhat precarious financial situations facing predominantly 
minority districts stand in contrast to the relatively sound funding re­
ceived by integrated districts. Lastly, the evidence is relevant to the 
current debate about returning to de facto segregated neighborhood 
schools and/or consciously creating single-race schools for minorities. 
There is waning support these days for continuing efforts to integrate 
schools, while there is growing support for educational reforms di­
rected at improving the education provided within racially isolated 
schools.10 What has been missing from this debate is consideration of 
the financial consequences of returning to de facto segregated schools 
or pursuing single-race schools; this Article suggests that the conse­
quences could be significant and deserve to be part of the contempo­
rary debate about school desegregation. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I examines the current 
expenditure levels of minority districts in order to ascertain whether 
these districts are underfunded relative to other districts within their 
respective states. It turns out that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
most minority districts are not relatively underfunded, but they are 
likely to become so when they lose funds that have been directed to 
them through court-ordered desegregation decrees. For those minor­
ity districts already funded below average, as well as for those that will 
soon fall into that category, school finance reform is of obvious impor­
tance. Parts II and III accordingly assess the performance of minority 
districts in school finance litigation and reform. In Part II, I examine 
how predominantly minority districts have fared when they have been 
involved in school finance litigation, and in Part III, I examine legisla­
tive responses to court decisions. Based on this examination, I con­
clude that race does appear to play an influential role in school finance 
litigation and legislative reform, and in Part IV, I discuss in some de­
tail the academic, historical, and practical implications of this conclu­
sion. 
9. I develop this thesis in greater detail in a separate article. See James E. Ryan, 
Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 272-96 (1999). 
10. See id. at 253-54. 
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A brief caveat is in order before proceeding. It seems clear from 
the evidence examined that minority districts - particularly urban 
minority districts - do not fare well in school finance litigation, and it 
seems reasonable to conclude that race is playing an influential role in 
determining outcomes. I would be the first to acknowledge, however, 
the limitations of my approach: there are a number of factors not re­
lated to race that cause plaintiffs to lose in court and that cause legisla­
tors to respond quickly or slowly to court orders, and I cannot pretend 
to have controlled for those numerous factors. The brush I am using is 
too broad. This Article thus represents a first look at the evidence and 
an invitation to those with the appropriate analytical skills to take a 
closer inspection of the data. In the meantime, however, the patterns 
noted below should enter the conversation about the future of school 
finance reform, the dismantling of desegregation decrees, and the fi­
nancial implications of returning to or promoting majority-minority 
schools. 
I. MYTHS AND REALITIES REGARDING RACE AND 
SCHOOL FUNDING 
Most black students - roughly two-thirds - attend elementary 
and secondary school in central city districts. Most central city dis­
tricts, in turn, are populated primarily by minority students - gener­
ally African-American and Hispanic. These students are also dispro­
portionately poor, and they generally perform below average on 
standardized tests.11 Poor students have greater educational needs and 
require more resources to educate than do affluent students.12 Schools 
dominated by poor students will therefore usually be more expensive 
to operate than schools populated by middle- and upper-income stu­
dents. In addition, because of generally higher costs in urban areas, as 
opposed to rural or suburban areas, inner city schools are typically 
more expensive to operate.13 The greater needs of poor children, cou­
pled with the greater costs of operating urban schools, virtually guar­
antee that urban schools will have to spend more than average simply 
to provide average educational opportunities. 
Although there is general agreement regarding the higher costs of 
educating poor children, particularly poor children in urban districts, 
11. See id. at 272-75 (discussing data regarding urban schools). 
12. See, e.g., JEAN ANYON, GHETIO SCHOOLING 6-7 (1997); WAYNE RIDDLE & LIANE 
WHITE, PUBLIC SCHOOL EXPENDITURE DISPARITIES, CONG. REs. SERV. REP. No. 96-51 
EPW, at 4, 24 (1995). Indeed, that poor students require additional resources is the premise 
of Title I, a federal program ostensibly designed to provide financial assistance to schools 
educating impoverished students. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1994). 
13. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ISSUE BRIEF IB-2-96, at 4 (Dec. 1996); 
see also Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 434 (N.J. 1997) ("Abbott IV"). -
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there is much discord concerning the relationship between expendi­
tures and achievement. An intense debate is raging within the educa­
tion policy world regarding the extent to which we can expect re­
sources to improve the academic achievement of urban minority 
students.14 For purposes of this Article, I would like to put this debate 
to one side and assume that resources will help these students. The 
question that I would like to address instead is the likelihood that stu­
dents in predominantly minority districts will receive resources suffi­
cient to provide an adequate education.15 A natural starting point for 
this inquiry is an examination of current expenditure levels in pre­
dominantly minority districts. 
It is easy to imagine, perhaps too easy, that predominantly minor­
ity schools are also the most poorly funded. This is the impression left 
by Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities, a well-known and searing -
but largely anecdotal - account of high poverty, urban minority 
schools.16 And the "fact" of underfunded minority schools is casually 
reported by commentators, often without citation or serious study.17 
The reality, however, is more complicated. In fact, it is generally not 
true that predominantly minority districts are "underfunded," if one 
defines that term in relation to the statewide average. 
At the same time, many of the minority districts that are spending 
over the statewide average are doing so as a result of desegregation 
funds, typically Milliken II funds for compensatory and remedial pro-
14. See Ryan, supra note 9, at 291-92 (discussing the debate regarding the extent to 
which spending and achievement are related-i.e., the extent to which "money matters"). 
15. By "resources sufficient to provide an adequate education," I do not mean anything 
more precise than the level of resources one could reasonably expect, if spent well, to cover 
the costs of providing an education that would prepare most students to enter the work force 
or go on to higher education. One of the problems that plagues school finance reform, and 
by extension this Article, is that no one really knows the exact level of resources necessary to 
provide an adequate education. The best one can do is to compare spending and results: if a 
particular school spends X amount of money per pupil and is achieving good results (e.g., 
most students perform adequately or better on standardized tests, go on to college, or find 
gainful employment after high school}, that spending level can be used as a benchmark for 
schools populated by a similar group of students. As a rough benchmark, I use statewide 
average expenditures. Although it is reasonable to expect that urban schools will need to 
spend more than average in order to produce average results, the statewide average is a de­
cent starting point for assessing the financial circumstances of minority districts. 
16. See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHil.DREN IN MIBRICA'S 
SCHOOLS 112-13 (1991). 
17. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure 
to Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1002 (1994) (citing 
Roberta L. Steel, Note, All Things Not Being Equal: The Case for Race Separate Schools, 43 
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 591, 620 (1993}}; see also id. at 1002 & nn.14-16 (citing figures from a 
student law review note and Kozol's Savage Inequalities as demonstrating that "the reality is 
that far more is spent on the average white student's education than on the average black 
student's"); Martha Minow, School Finance: Does Money Matter?, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
395, 399 (1991). 
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grams.18 A comparison of predominantly minority districts spending 
over the statewide average with those spending below that average 
bears out this hypothesis, although there are some exceptions. When 
desegregation funding is terminated, as is occurring in states across the 
country, expenditure levels for predominantly minority districts will 
certainly fall. 19 Thus, while the perception that minority schools are 
underfunded may not be accurate now, it may be closer to reality in 
the near future. 
· 
A. Data and Methodology 
Before describing the data regarding the racial composition of 
school districts and their expenditure levels, it is necessary to describe 
and justify the measure used here as a benchmark. Because of the 
varied ways in which equity in school funding can be measured, ineq­
uitable school funding is often in the eye of the beholder. The most 
common baseline for measurement is horizontal, intrastate equity, 
which simply examines how expenditures per pupil vary among dis­
tricts within the same state. Although a useful starting point, the 
shortcomings of this measurement are obvious. Left out of considera­
tion are the differences in student needs and in the costs of providing 
similar services, two factors that can substantially affect the purchasing 
power of an education dollar. That a rural district and an urban dis­
trict have the same funding per pupil may not be equitable, for exam­
ple, if it costs more to provide the same services in urban areas and/or 
if the urban district has students with more expensive needs.20 
18. In Milliken II, the Court held that compensatory and remedial programs can be in­
cluded as part of a court-ordered desegregation decree, and that states can be ordered to 
contribute to the funding of such programs. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
19. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing the termination of desegre­
gation funding). 
20. Just as focusing on horizontal equity has some shortcomings, so too does focusing 
solely on intrastate disparities and ignoring interstate disparities. Interstate disparities can 
be dramatic. In the 1994-95 school year, for example, average per-pupil spending varied 
from a low of $3,431 in Utah to a high of $9,136 in New Jersey. See RIDDLE & WIDTE, supra 
note 12, at 19. (In a classroom of 25 students, this $5,700 disparity amounts to $142,500 per 
class.) The disparities between the poorest districts of one state and the wealthiest of an­
other are of an even higher magnitude, approaching and sometimes exceeding $10,000 per 
pupil. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 1020 CONG., REPORT ON 
SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN: THE IMPACT OF FISCAL INEQUITY ON THE EDUCATION OF 
STUDENTS AT RISK 19-20 (Comm. Print 1991) (prepared by William L. Taylor & Dianne M. 
Piche) [hereinafter SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN] (reporting that the lowest spending dis­
trict in Mississippi spent $1,324 per pupil in 1986-87, while in the same year two of the high­
est spending districts in New York spent $11,752 and $10,544 per pupil). 
I will not focus on interstate disparities primarily for practical reasons: school finance 
reform has traditionally been a state-by-state effort, and there appears little current prospect 
for increased federal involvement in encouraging or requiring interstate equality. The clos­
est thing to federal involvement is a provision in the 1994 Improving America's Schools Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-802, ("!ASA") that authorizes a funding incentive to encourage states to 
equalize their own school finance schemes. Although this provision could potentially help 
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I rely for discussion and analysis primarily on expenditure figures 
for seventy-four urban districts, contained in a recent special edition of 
Education Week, which focused on the status of urban schools.21 
These seventy-four districts are a representative sample of urban dis­
tricts across the country and thus include at least one urban district 
from each state, with the exception of the handful of states (such as 
Montana and Maine) that are ovenvhelmingly rural. The expenditure 
figures reported in the compilation are weighted to account for differ­
ences in cost of living and in the educational needs of the students in 
the district.22 This weighting of expenditures provides a more accurate 
picture of the actual purchasing power of an educational dollar and 
thus allows for a more realistic comparison of districts. 
I compare these weighted per-pupil expenditures against the state 
average expenditure, in an effort to assess whether one can fairly con­
clude that urban minority districts are underfunded. To be sure, this is 
not the only possible basis of comparison. One could compare 
spending in urban districts to that in surrounding suburbs, a compari­
son that typically reveals fairly large disparities in favor of the subur­
ban districts and one that forms the basis of a number of school fi­
nance cases.23 Although these urban-suburban disparities are 
discussed, using statewide averages as the benchmark for comparison 
seems the best way to control for some differences in expenditures 
that are not likely linked to race. If affluent suburban districts, as is 
usually the case, are spending well above both urban minority districts 
and the state average, they are also spending at levels above those of 
other white suburban and rural districts that are less affluent. By con­
trast, if the average school district in the state is spending above urban 
eradicate interstate disparities, the unlikelihood that the federal government will play a large 
role in addressing those disparities is perhaps best revealed by the fact that the provision in 
the !ASA has not been funded. See LIANE WHITE, EDUCATION FINANCE INCENTIVE 
GRANT UNDER ESEA TITLE I, CONG. REs. SERV. REP. No. 95-963 EPW (1995). It is none­
theless instructive to keep the interstate disparities in mind, if only to provide some perspec­
tive on the scope and magnitude of intrastate disparities. 
21. See Quality Counts, EDUC. WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at 56. 
22. More and more researchers in the field are making such adjustments to expenditure 
levels in an effort to capture the actual "buying power" of educational funds within different 
kinds of districts. Although it has long been recognized that cost and need adjustments 
should be made in assessing equity in school financing, see, e.g., ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA 
STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE (1984), the approach used 
to weigh expenditures is still being refined. See, e.g., NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, supra note 13, at 3 (" 'Buying power' is a new concept currently under devel­
opment by the education research community. Actual dollars are expressed to reflect differ­
ences in the relative costs of providing educational services," including differences in costs of 
living and differences in the educational needs of students.). The basic approach is to count 
students with special needs and students living in urban districts as a fraction above one stu­
dent. See id. 
23. See, e.g., George C. Galster, Polarization, Place, and Race, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 
1441 (1993) (noting that, as "[c]ompared to suburban districts, the forty-seven largest urban 
districts spend $873 less per pupil"). 
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minority districts, then it seems more likely that race is a plausible ex­
planation of the disparity. 
B. Myths 
The central myth that must be addressed (though not completely 
debunked) is that predominantly minority districts are generally un­
derfunded as compared to predominantly or exclusively white dis­
tricts.24 This common misperception likely stems from the historical 
reality that, prior to and for a period after Brown, minority schools 
typically received fewer state funds than white schools.25 But this no 
longer appears to be true. Instead, there is a great deal of variation 
both across and within states. Some urban, heavily minority districts 
spend well above the state average, whereas others - sometimes 
within the same state - spend below the state average. On balance, it 
appears that minority districts are more likely than not to spend above 
the state average, even after adjusting for the higher costs of providing 
educational services in urban areas. 
Specifically, among the seventy-four urban districts examined, 
forty-five spent above the statewide average in 1993-94, the school 
year for which the figures were compiled. Of these forty-five districts, 
nine were majority white, and thirty-six were majority non-white. 
Twenty-eight of the urban districts spent below the statewide average. 
Of these twenty-eight, five were majority white, and twenty-three 
were majority non-white. Focusing solely on the minority districts re­
veals that thirty-six of fifty-nine predominantly minority districts (or 
61 % ) in this sample spent above statewide averages.26 
Some of these thirty-six districts, moreover, spent well above the 
statewide average: Little Rock, Phoenix, Atlanta, Kansas City (MO), 
Pittsburgh, and Richmond all spent more than $1,000 per pupil above 
the state average. Conversely, some of the minority districts spending 
below the state average were quite near the average, with six (Sacra­
mento, San Jose, Kansas City (KS), Clark County (NV), Fort Worth, 
and Norfolk) spending only $100 or less per pupil below the statewide 
average.27 Given that the figures have been adjusted to account for 
the higher costs of providing educational services in urban areas, it is 
24. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled 
Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1321 (1995) (asserting, without citation, that "predominantly 
African-American or minority school districts often receive significantly fewer financial re­
sources"). 
25. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 88, 122, 134 (1975); 
John J. Donohue Ill et al., Social Action, Private Choice and Philanthropy, at 3-4 (Dec. 
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
26. For the figures in this paragraph, see Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 25-75. 
27. See id. at 56-57, 62-63, 66-67. 
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safe to assume that actual expenditure levels in at least these six dis­
tricts - and probably others - exceeded statewide averages. 
Funding levels also do not appear to correlate in a linear way with 
the percentage of minority students in districts. It is not consistently 
true, in other words, that the greater the percentage of minority stu­
dents, the less the funding levels.28 In Virginia, for example, Rich­
mond spends $1100 per pupil above the state average and is 92% mi­
nority. Norfolk, which is only 67% minority, spends $300 below the 
statewide average. In Florida, the school district of which Miami is a 
part is 85% minority and spends $350 above the statewide average, as 
compared to the Broward County School District, which is 49% mi­
nority and spends only $16 above the statewide average. There are 
counterexamples, to be sure. Compton, California, is 100% minority, 
for example, and spends $250 below the statewide average, while San 
Diego is only 69% minority and spends $450 above the statewide av­
erage.29 But the fact that there is variation is enough to prove the 
point that funding levels, at least at the moment, do not consistently 
drop as the percentage of minority students rises. 
This is not to deny that there is evidence that funding disparities 
within some states closely track the racial composition of districts. To 
understand the full picture, which unfortunately most closely resem­
bles a Picasso, it is worth considering that as of 1991, overall intrastate 
disparities - measured by the coefficient of variation30 - appeared 
"to be greatest in industrialized, high-population states with substan­
tial minority populations."31 These states, which include Illinois, New 
28. In fact, a 1989-90 national study conducted by the National Center for Education 
Statistics found that, on average, districts with the highest percentage of minorities spent the 
most per pupil. See THOMAS B. PARRISH, h"T AL., DISPARITIES IN PuBLIC SCHOOL 
DISTRICT SPENDING 1989-90, at 12 {National Ctr. for Educ. Statistics No. 95-300, 1995). 
These figures, although quite surprising at first, turn out not to be particularly instructive. 
The primary reason is that the figures do not account for different costs in urban districts. 
The same study adjusted the figures to reflect cost differentials and concluded that districts 
with the highest percentage of minorities spent the least, and districts with the lowest per­
centage of minority students spent the most. See id. at 13-14. In addition, the study found 
that total expenditures per student were higher in communities with higher socioeconomic 
status, as measured by the value of housing and by education attainment. See id. at 11-12. 
29. For the figures cited in this paragraph, see Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 64-67; 
see also SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 20, at 23-24 (reporting that in both Missis­
sippi and Maryland, data reveal that the lowest-spending districts tend to have the highest 
concentrations of poor black students). 
30. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation from the mean expenditure 
divided by the mean. The standard deviation, in turn, is the average variation from the 
mean of a distribution of numbers. The coefficient of variation thus takes into account the 
expenditure levels of all districts within the state, and it records the standard deviation as a 
percentage of the mean. Thus, if the coefficient of variation is 30%, then the average varia­
tion from the mean is 30% of the mean. In plainer, bottom-line terms: the higher the coeffi­
cient of variation, the greater the disparity among districts in a particular state. For a helpful 
explanation, along with a sample illustration, see, e.g., RIDDLE & WHITE, supra note 12, at 
5-6. 
31. SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 20, at 21. 
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Jersey, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas, also 
have highly segregated schools.32 And within these states, the districts 
with the lowest expenditures often had the highest percentage of mi­
nority students, and those with the highest expenditures typically had 
the highest percentage of white students.33 The disparities in these 
states, which exist most dramatically between urban and suburban dis­
tricts, probably explain why urban districts were involved in school fi­
nance challenges in all of these states, a topic addressed below. For 
now, however, I only note this evidence to round out the picture and 
to acknowledge that using statewide averages as the relevant bench­
mark can sometimes mask significant disparities among minority and 
majority white districts.34 
C. Realities 
What accounts for the surprising fact that most minority districts 
appear to be funded at a level above their respective state averages? 
One potential explanation is that race plays no role in school financ­
ing, and that predominantly minority districts fare well in the political 
process when it comes to capturing state educational funds. If this 
were true, the increasing segregation among school districts and the 
pursuit of single race schools would raise no serious financial implica­
tions. But this explanation, while it may hold true in a couple of 
states,35 does not appear generally persuasive.36 
32 See id. at 21-22; see also Gary Or.field et al., Deepening Segregation in American 
Public Schools (Harvard Project on School Desegregation, April 5, 1997) (listing states ac­
cording to degree of segregation among districts). More recent data is consistent with the 
findings reported in 1991. As of 1995, for example, Illinois, Ohio, New York, and Michigan 
still reported some of the largest disparities among district expenditures. See RIDDLE & 
WHITE, supra note 12, at 10. 
33. See SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 20, at 22-23 (discussing court findings 
in New Jersey and Texas); see also W.Jiam E. Camp et. al., Within-District Equity: Desegre­
gation and Microeconomic Analysis, in THE IMPACT'S OF LmGATION AND LEGISLATION ON 
PuBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 273 (Julie Underwood & Deborah A. Verstegen eds., 1990) (de­
scribing intradistrict spending disparities among black and white schools in Little Rock, St. 
Louis, and Los Angeles). 
34. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF GREAT CITY SCHOOLS, NATIONAL URBAN EDUCATION 
GOALS: BASELINE INDICATORS, 1990-91 85 (1992) [hereinafter BASELINE INDICATORS] 
(reporting that, in 1990-91, the average per-pupil expenditure in the forty-seven largest ur­
ban school systems was $5,200, compared to an average expenditure of $6,073 in suburban 
schools and $5,476 in rural schools). 
35. The two states in which this explanation may be true are, oddly enough given their 
history, Virginia and Georgia. The school district in Richmond, Virginia, is 92% minority, 
and it spends $1,100 per pupil over the state average. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 
66-67. The district receives no desegregation money, and the state finance scheme was up­
held, so the additional funding is not traceable to a court order. See School Bd. of Richmond 
v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim for Milliken II funding); Scott 
v. Virginia, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994) (upholding school finance scheme). Similarly, Atlanta 
is 93% minority, spends roughly $1,500 per pupil over the state average, and receives no de­
segregation or any other court-ordered money. See McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 
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Rather, for many districts, the explanation appears to lie in 
whether the district is receiving desegregation funding. Although I 
was unable to gather information for all seventy-four districts, the 
available evidence indicates that many predominantly minority dis­
tricts with expenditure levels well above the statewide average receive 
money from the state or federal government for "desegregation" pur­
poses. The state funds are typically part of Milliken II remedies, while 
the limited federal money comes from a federal program that provides 
financial support for magnet schools.37 Districts such as Phoenix, Lit­
tle Rock, Boston, Kansas City (Mo.), St. Louis, Cincinnati, Cleveland, 
and Los Angeles all receive desegregation funding, and all spend 
above their respective state averages.38 The correlation is far from 
perfect, and there are some notable exceptions, such as Atlanta and 
Richmond, both of which spend a great deal over their respective state 
averages but neither of which receives desegregation funding.39 
{Ga. 1981) (upholding state finance scheme); BASELINE INDICATORS, supra note 34, at 81; 
Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 64, 66. 
36. Another alternative explanation that cannot be completely ruled out, but which is 
also not facially persuasive, is that different property values and tax rates within these dis­
tricts determine the different levels of funding. This explanation does not seem plausible, 
for several reasons. First, as a general matter, property values in central cities have been 
declining, particularly in the Northeast, as manufacturing and other businesses have left cen­
iral cities. See Paul L. Tractenberg, A Tale of Two States: A Comparative Study of School 
Finance and Educational Reform in California and New JeFSey 8-9 (Dec. 5, 1997) (unpub­
lished manuscript, on file with author). Yet some minority districts in the Northeast spend 
above the state average (Boston), whereas others in the Northeast spend below the state 
average {New York, Philadelphia). See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 65-66. Second, and 
similarly, it is difficult to discern a pattern, geographical or otherwise, among the districts 
that would suggest property values are playing an important role - i.e., the districts on ei­
ther side of the line come from all geographical regions and include cities of differing sizes. 
See id. Third, the possibility that cities receiving desegregation funding will be able to make 
up the loss of funds with increased property taxes seems slim, in light of the evidence indi­
cating that tax rates in urban areas are already higher than state averages and that compet­
ing demands for social services in cities makes it difficult to raise additional resources for 
education. See MARK G. YUDOF Er AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 658 {3d ed. 
1992); Tractenberg, supra, at 4-10. 
37. See 20 U. S.C. § 3021 {1988). 
38. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 64-67, 101 {Phoenix), 104 (Little Rock), 78-79 
{Boston), 225 {Cleveland), 190-91 {Kansas City & St. Louis); BASELINE INDICATORS, supra 
note 34, at 81. For a number of the districts, I was able to gather information about desegre­
gation funding from relevant education officials. See Telephone Interview with Mark 
Schrager, State Budget Office (June 29, 1998) (reporting that Los Angeles receives roughly 
$400 million per year from the State to provide money for desegregation programs); Tele­
phone Interview with John Mc Donough, State Board of Education (June 30, 1998) (report­
ing that Boston receives roughly $55 million from the state for desegregation purposes); 
Telephone Interview with Jerry Klekamp, Cincinnati School District (June 30, 1998) (re­
porting that the State provides the Cincinnati School District roughly $5 million annually for 
desegregation purposes); Telephone Interview with Richard Nielson, Director, Desegrega­
tion Program, Oeveland School District (July 7, 1998) (reporting that, as part of desegrega­
tion settlement, Oeveland will receive $295 million from the State over a period of seven 
years). 
39. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 66-67. Richmond appears to have benefited 
from a school finance formula that devotes additional aid to districts with impoverished stu-
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The evidence nonetheless seems strong enough to discern a gen­
eral trend, particularly when one examines the predominantly minor­
ity districts that spend below the state average. Among these twenty­
three districts, I have been able to gather information about seven­
teen.40 Of these seventeen districts, only three (Chicago, San Fran­
cisco, and Long Beach, California) were receiving desegregation 
funding.41 The other fifteen were not. Thus, large city districts like 
Baltimore, Philadelphia,42 New York, and Jersey City, all spent below 
the statewide average and none received desegregation money.43 Al­
though correlation does not prove causation, and although it is diffi­
cult to know whether these districts are suffering financially because 
of or despite their racial compositions, the pattern is still fairly strik­
ing. 
To the extent that desegregation funding is responsible for bloat­
ing per-pupil expenditures in many predominantly minority districts, 
several significant points follow. The first is that the relatively high 
levels of spending among some predominantly minority districts may 
be misleading. Although the myth regarding minority districts and 
school funding is facially and currently inaccurate, it may actually be 
close to reality, insofar as the myth appears to rest on an accurate sup­
position regarding the political power of minority districts. That is to 
dents. The school district's success is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that in 1987 it 
unsuccessfully sought Milliken II money, despite the fact that it had already been declared 
unitary. See School Bd. of Richmond, Va. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that because "we have found no vestiges of state-mandated segregation . . follow­
ing a finding of unitary status, we affirm the court's refusal to order state funding of remedial 
and compensatory programs"). 
40. For the figures on expenditures, see Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 66-67. 
Through telephone interviews with state and local education officials, I was able to gather 
information about desegregation funding in the following 8 districts: Long Beach (Tele­
phone Interview of Maureen Cruz, District Budget director) (July 1, 1998); San Francisco 
(Telephone Interview of Greg Bender, District Staff) (July 1, 1998); Chicago (Telephone 
Interview of Joanna Koh, District Stuff) (June 30, 1998); East St. Louis (Telephone Inter­
view of Richard Wells, District Staff) (June 30, 1998); Baltimore (Telephone Interview of 
Charles Grissett, Chief Financial Officer of District) (June 30, 1998); Oklahoma City (Tele­
phone Interview of Sand Henry, District Treasurer) (July 1, 1998); Houston (Telephone In­
terview of Boon Chu, District Staff) (July 1, 1998); and Norfolk (Telephone Interview of Dr. 
Mark Snitzer, District Staff) (July 1, 1998). I was also able to gather information about the 
following nine districts: Camden, Jersey City, Paterson, Albuquerque, Providence, Bridge­
port, New York, and Philadelphia. None of these districts, as far as I could tell, receives de­
segregation funding. The first seven listed have never been subject to a desegregation de­
cree; for information on New York and Philadelphia, see infra notes 47-49 and 
accompanying text 
41. See BASELINE INDICATORS, supra note 34, at 79, 81; telephone interviews and re­
lated research, supra note 40. 
42 See Pennsylvanian Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist of Phila., 667 A.2d 
1173, 1178 (Pa. Comm. Ct 1995) (addressing funding of desegregation decree for first time); 
651 A.2d 186, 188 n.4 (Pa. Comm. Ct 1994) (postponing decision on desegregation funding). 
43. See BASELINE INDICATORS, supra note 34, at 81 (Baltimore); Quality Counts, supra 
note 21, at 215-16 (New York). 
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say, underlying the myth that minority school districts are under­
funded must be the assumption that heavily minority school districts 
fare worse than white school districts when state legislatures divide up 
school funds.44 This assumption is supported by the evidence regard­
ing the relative positions of minority school districts receiving and not 
receiving desegregation funding. The former, as a group, appear bet­
ter off financially than the latter, but this advantage is traceable not to 
success in the political process but to federal court orders. When fed­
eral courts are absent from the scene, as is the case with the districts 
not receiving desegregation money, heavily minority districts do not 
seem to fare well in the political arena. 
This dynamic is illustrated by contrasting several school districts: 
Little Rock, Arkansas, which receives desegregation funding, and 
Philadelphia and New York, which do not. Little Rock, partially as a 
result of desegregation money,45 spends $1100 per pupil more than the 
state average. The school district is sufficiently advantaged by this 
funding scheme that it actually intervened on the side of the state in a 
case challenging the state's school finance system, which was brought 
by white rural districts.46 
New York and Philadelphia, by contrast, are currently challenging 
their respective state financing schemes. Both cities have high per­
centages of minority students (79% and 83%, respectively), and both 
spend $800 less per pupil than the state average (when costs are ad­
justed).47 They are challenging their respective state's finance scheme 
not only on the typical ground that the scheme violates the state con­
stitutional educational clause, but also on the ground that the funding 
scheme contravenes the regulations of Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. Title VI prohibits any state entity (including a school dis­
trict) that receives federal funds from discriminating on the basis of 
race, and courts have interpreted implementing regulations as allow-
44. In referring to state legislatures dividing up school funds, I mean to include not only 
the distribution of state education funds, but also the selection and maintenance of a school 
finance scheme that relies on local property taxes for a large share of school funding. 
45. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 839 F.2d 1296 
(8th Cir. 1988) (ordering increased funding for Little Rock and other Pulaski county school 
districts); see also MICHAEL A. REBELL ET AL., FISCAL EQUITY IN EDUCATION: A 
PROPOSALFOR A DIALOGICREMEDY, at A-5 (1995) ("In 1989, the Legislature agreed, pur­
suant to an order in the Little Rock school desegregation case [Pulask1 , to allocate an addi­
tional $131 million to Little Rock and other Pulaski county school districts beyond the regu­
lar state aid to which the districts were entitled."). 
46. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); see also Magnolia 
Sch. Dist. No. 14 v. Arkansas State Bd. of Educ., 799 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Ark. 1990); REBELL 
ET AL., supra note 45, at A-5 (noting that "[s]chool desegregation costs have . . .  affected fis­
cal equity reform in Arkansas"). 
47. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 64-67. 
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ing for disparate impact claims.48 In both the New York and 
Philadelphia cases, the minority districts have alleged that they do not 
receive their fair share of state funding; both suits have survived mo­
tions to dismiss and are pending in trial courts.49 
The second, related point is that court-ordered desegregation 
funding is temporary and is only guaranteed during the period of court 
supervision. When desegregation decrees are lifted, this funding will 
likely be reduced or perhaps cut altogether.50 Indeed, a number of dis­
tricts and states have already entered into agreements under which the 
state has agreed to pay the district a substantial sum over a period of 
several years in exchange for being released from any further desegre­
gation obligations - financial or otherwise. Typical of such agree­
ments is the one struck in Kansas City, Missouri, where the state has 
agreed to pay the district $314 million over three years in exchange for 
the elimination of any further desegregation-related duties. The 
agreement has already sent district officials scrambling to cut money 
from their budgets,51 and it has also sent white suburban students 
scrambling back to the suburbs.52 Wells and Crain, at the conclusion 
48. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 669-70 (N.Y. 
1995). AJ; the court in Campaign for Fiscal Equity described: "A validly stated cause of ac­
tion under the Title VI regulations thus has two components: 'whether a challenged practice 
has a sufficiently adverse racial impact . . .  and, if so, whether the practice is nevertheless 
adequately justified," id. at 670 (quoting Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. 
Supp. 1518, 1523 (D. Ala. 1991)); accord Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist, 868 
F.2d 750, 754 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989); Georgia State Conferences of Branches of NAACP v. 
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985). 
49. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs stated claim 
under Title VI and its implementing regulations); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d at 
670 & n.9 (noting that plaintiffs alleged that minority students in New York, as a result of 
state funding formula, received 12 % less in state aid than state-wide average). 
50. See Gary Orfield & David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain Gains, 
Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY LJ. 759, 769 (1993) ("School districts should further consider 
the loss of court-ordered funding, often called Milliken II funding, in deciding to file for 
declarations of unitary status." (footnote omitted)). 
51. See Caroline Hendrie, Falling Stars, EDUC. WK. ON THE WEB (Feb. 25, 1998) 
<http://www.edweek.org!ew/vol-17 /24kc2.hl 7>. 
52 See Alison Morantz, Money and Choice in Kansas City, in GARY ORFIELD ET AL., 
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 241, 262 (1996); Jeanne Ponessa, Missouri Is Trying to Free 
Itself from Subsidizing Costly Desegregation Programs in Kansas City and St. Louis, in 
Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 190-93. Kansas City also provides a good illustration of the 
political dynamic that seems to be at work with regard to minority districts and funding. The 
Kansas City School District at one time was predominantly white, but eventually became 
majority black, despite the fact that the City population remained majority white. AJ; Elaine 
R. Jones reports, "from almost precisely the moment the school district became majority 
black, the majority white electorate consistently voted against bond issues and tax levies, 
precipitating a catastrophic decline in the capital and educational resources of the school 
district." Elaine R. Jones, Foreword to ORFIELD ET AL., supra, at viii. This decline was ar­
rested by the extensive "desegregation" remedies ordered by a federal court, which brought 
into the district a remarkable amount of additional funding. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 
U.S. 70, 78-80 (1995). But now that the desegregation decree is terminating, it appears that 
the additional funding will be reduced, and the district may end up in the same place that it 
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of their St. Louis case study, predict a similar end to the St. Louis de­
segregation decree, asserting that "[t]he removal of the court order 
would no doubt be the beginning of the end of extra state resources to 
the city schools."53 An editorial writer in St. Louis was even more 
blunt: "Not many things in life are certain, but count on this much: If 
the desegregation program ends, and the sun rises in the east, the 
State of Missouri will most assuredly not gratuitously pump into the 
city the . . .  extra desegregation dollars it now spends under the court 
order."54 
Once court-ordered desegregation decrees are lifted, districts that 
have been receiving additional funding through court orders will likely 
be unable to secure the same level of funding from state legislatures. 
Given the lackluster performance of districts that have received addi­
tional desegregation funds,55 state legislatures are not likely to be sym­
pathetic to the argument that the flow of additional money should 
continue. Indeed, the reason states are seeking a court declaration of 
unitary status is presumably to be relieved of their desegregation obli­
gations, including any attendant financial responsibilities. It thus 
seems implausible that state officials would turn around and devote 
the money saved from the termination of the desegregation plan to the 
schools that benefited from the plan.56 In fact, it seems just as likely, if 
not more, that these districts will face a takeover by the state rather 
than increased funding if their achievement levels remain low.57 
started. That this majority black district received additional funding only because of court 
order cannot be gainsaid. 
53. See AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN, STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE: 
AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WJilTE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 336 (1997). Wells and 
Crain tie this prediction specifically to racial politics: "The racial politics of Missouri, with 
its mostly white and rural constituents, makes it difficult for elected officials to fund urban 
educational programs in the absence of court orders that say they must." Id. at 114; see also 
Caroline Hendrie, Judge Ends Desegregation Case in Cleveland, EDUC. WK. ON THE WEB 
(Apr. 8, 1998) <http://www.edweek.org/ew/1998/30cleve.h17> (court declares Cleveland 
"unitary," but rules that state and district must fulfill earlier agreement to provide $40 mil­
lion a year in extra state funding until the year 2000). 
54. Ray Hartman, In Defense of Desegregation: Separate Won't Be Equal, THE 
RIVERFRONTTIMEs, Oct. 6-12, 1993, at 2. 
55. See, e.g., Morantz, supra note 52, at 260; Ryan, supra note 9, at 289-93. 
56. Wells & Crain make this point with regard to efforts by the State to terminate the 
desegregation plan in St. Louis. As they observe, "[s]tate and local politicians are on a mis­
sion to end the [desegregation] case for political and economic reasons . . . .  Thus, the idea 
that any state money not spent on desegregation would be spent on schools, particularly ur­
ban schools, seems a little farfetched." WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 53, at 336-37. 
57. Twenty-one districts have already been taken over by state or city officials in recent 
years. See Race and Takeovers, EDUC. WK. ON THE WEB (Jan. 14, 1998) 
<http://www.edweek.org/ew/vol-17/18minsl.h17>. Of these districts, all but three are pre­
dominantly minority, and over half are more than 80% minority. See id. An additional eight 
districts have been threatened with a takeover, and six of these are predominantly minority 
districts. See id. State officials consistently deny that race plays any role in the takeovers, 
but black and Hispanic school board members just as consistently suggest that they are being 
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Insofar as minority districts do not fare particularly well in the po­
litical process when it comes to securing school funds, school finance 
litigation, which is designed to circumvent the political process and re­
direct the flow of funds to poorer districts, increases in importance. 
As the next two Parts reveal, however, school finance litigation has 
not proven very rewarding to minority school districts. 
II. MINORITY DISTRICTS AND SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
This Part examines the success, or lack thereof, experienced by 
minority districts in school finance litigation. It is important to em­
phasize at the outset that a number of urban minority districts have 
not participated in school finance challenges brought in their states.58 
Part of the explanation lies, again, in desegregation funding, which has 
tended to boost expenditure levels in minority districts and has ren­
dered some districts poor candidates for plaintiffs in school finance 
litigation. Thus, urban districts such as Phoenix, Denver, Boston, 
Minneapolis, and St. Paul did not participate in the school finance 
challenges brought in their states. Little Rock and Nashville­
Davidson County did participate in school finance cases - but as in­
tervenors on the side of the state. This is not to say that all urban dis­
tricts receiving desegregation funding stayed on the sidelines in school 
finance cases; the disparities between urban and suburban districts are 
sufficient enough in some states that some Milliken II districts signed 
on as plaintiffs in school finance challenges. But the urban (and rural) 
minority districts that did join school finance challenges - including 
Newark, Camden, Jersey City, Hartford, Philadelphia, New York, Bal­
timore, and Providence - typically were not receiving any desegrega­
tion funding.59 
singled out for discriminatory treatment See Beth Reinhard, Racial Issues Cloud State 
Takeovers, Eouc. WK. ON THE WEB (Jan. 14, 1998) <http://www.edweek.org/ew/1998/ 
18minor.h17>. 
58. Most of the cases, as will be discussed below, have been brought by suburban or ru­
ral districts. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota is under the impression that 
school finance challenges are typically brought by urban districts. See Skeen v. State, 505 
N.W.2d 299, 302 (Minn. 1993) ("Unlike challenges to state financing of education in other 
states, which frequently have been initiated by property-poor inner-city districts, this case 
does not involve the three largest metropolitan school districts, Minneapolis, St. Paul, and 
Duluth."). This may be reading too much into one errant comment, but that the Minnesota 
court would make this (incorrect) observation suggests both that popular perception may 
envision school finance plaintiffs as urban minority districts and that the type of district in­
volved weighs on the minds of judges adjudicating these suits. 
59. See supra note 40. 
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A. Successful and Unsuccessful School Finance Plaintiffs 
Before examining the demographics of school districts involved in 
school finance litigation, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of 
school finance litigation as a whole. Commentators divide school fi­
nance litigation into three phases, or waves, which are not as mono­
lithic as commentators suggest but which nonetheless help in explain­
ing the basic progression of the litigation.60 The first phase involved 
federal and state court challenges to education financing systems 
based on the federal Equal Protection Clause. This phase was short­
lived. It began with a successful challenge in 1971 to California's fi­
nancing scheme in Serrano v. Priest.61 It ended two years later with the 
Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez, in which the Court held that school funding inequities do 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.62 With the federal Constitu­
tion foreclosed as a source for their challenges, school finance plain­
tiffs turned to state constitutions. 
The second phase began shortly after Rodrigu.,ez, when the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, in Robinson v. Cahill,63 declared the education 
financing scheme in New Jersey unconstitutional on the ground that it 
violated the state constitution's "thorough and efficient education" 
clause. The cases in this phase generally focused on the education and 
equal protection clauses in state constitutions and generally sought 
equalized funding per pupil.64 Court results in the second phase were 
60. See, e.g., Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform, 48 V AND. L. REV. 101 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance 
Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1153-
66 (1995) (describing three waves of school finance litigation); William E. Thro, Judicial 
Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as 
a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 598 n.4 (1994) (same); Julie K. Underwood & William E. 
Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 
517, 520-35 (1991) (same). 
61. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) ("Serrano I'') (finding that wealth is a 
suspect classification and education a fundamental right, and striking down property-based 
funding scheme on state and federal equal protection grounds). 
62. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
63. 303 A.2d 273 (1973). 
64. See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983) (holding that 
financing scheme violates state equal protection provision); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 
1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980) (holding state finance scheme in violation of state 
equal protection clause on the ground that education is a fundamental right and wealth a 
suspect classification); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) ("Horton I") (holding 
that state equal protection and education clauses require substantial equality in funding edu­
cation); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) ("Serrano II") (rejecting legislative re­
sponse to Serrano I on the ground that it did not provide sufficient assurance of equalization; 
legislative scheme had to ensure that funding would vary no more than $100 per pupil), cert. 
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977). 
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mixed: of the twenty challenges resolved by state supreme courts, 
thirteen were rejected,65 and seven were successful.66 
The third and current phase of school finance litigation began in 
1989 with a couple of significant court victories in Kentucky67 and 
Montana.68 The third wave cases are for the most part characterized 
by a strict focus on state education clauses and an emphasis on ade­
quacy rather than equity - the claim made, in other words, is not that 
each student is entitled to equal funding, but rather that all students 
are entitled to funding sufficient to provide an "adequate" education.69 
65. Challenges were rejected in the following states: Arizona, see Shofstall v. Hollins, 
515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973) (rejecting equal protection challenge to financing scheme, despite 
declaring education a fundamental right); Colorado, see Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of 
Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (holding that education is not a fundamental right and 
that state education clause does not require uniform expenditure levels); Georgia, see 
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981) (upholding state financing scheme and con­
cluding that "adequate education" clause requires more than minimum education, but that 
the Legislature must determine content of adequate education); Idaho, see Thompson v. En­
gelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975) (upholding finance scheme against challenge based on 
state equal protection and education clauses); Maryland, see Hornbeck v. Somerset County 
Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983) (rejecting challenge based on state equal protection 
and "thorough and efficient" education clauses); New York, see Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 
439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982) (upholding scheme on ground that education clause is not a 
mandate of equality and that education is not a fundamental right); North Carolina, see Britt 
v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 361 
S.E.2d 71 (1987) (upholding scheme on ground that "general and uniform" education clause 
only guarantees equal access to schools, and "equal opportunity" provision only bars racial 
segregation); Ohio, see Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979) (rejecting 
challenges based on equal protection and "thorough and efficient" education clauses on 
ground that Legislature has discretion in educational matters, with which court will not inter­
fere where education appears adequate); Oklahoma, see Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 
P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987) (rejecting challenge based on state equal protection and education 
clauses); Oregon, see Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976) (rejecting challenge based on 
state equal protection and education clauses); Pennsylvania, see Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 
360 (Pa. 1979) (rejecting challenge based on state equal protection and "thorough and effi­
cient" education clauses); South Carolina, see Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 
(S.C. 1988) (rejecting challenge based on state education and equal protection clauses); 
Washington, see Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974) (re­
jecting challenge based on state constitution's education and equal protection provisions). 
66. Successful challenges were brought in the following states: Arkansas, see Dupree, 
651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); California, see Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 929; Connecticut, see Hor­
ton I, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); New Jersey, see Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 
1973) ("Robinson I''); Washington, see Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 
1978) (invalidating school finance scheme, without reversing Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, on the 
ground that education clause requires provision of basic education); West Virginia, see 
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that school financing scheme must be 
adequate, based on "thorough and efficient" education clause, and equal, based on equal 
protection clause); Wyoming, see Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 
310 (Wyo. 1980) (holding that school financing scheme failed to ensure equal educational 
opportunity as required by state equal protection and education clauses). 
67. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
68. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989). 
69. See Thro, supra note 60, at 603. Thro contends that in the current wave of cases, 
"instead of emphasizing equality of expenditures, the plaintiffs have argued that all children 
are entitled to an education of a least a certain quality and that more money is necessary to 
bring the worst school districts up to the minimum level mandated by the state education 
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The shift in focus from equality to adequacy was in some cases a 
matter of choice or strategy, and in other cases a matter of necessity, 
as litigants who had already lost on an equality claim returned to court 
for a second or third time. The results in the so-called third wave have 
also been mixed, although the win-loss ratio, at eleven wins70 and 
eleven losses,71 is better than that of the second phase.72 
clause." Id.; see also Heise, supra note 60, at 1153 (noting that "the third wave illustrates the 
replacement of traditional 'equity' court decisions with 'adequacy' decisions"). 
70. Successful challenges have been brought in Alabama, see Opinion of the Justices No. 
338, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (advisory opinion directing state senate to follow trial court 
order, which found financing scheme unconstitutional); Arizona, see Roosevelt Elementary 
Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) (invalidating system for funding school 
facilities after finding that funding scheme causes "gross disparities and creates inadequate 
educational opportunities"); Kentucky, see Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (invalidating the 
"whole gamut" of the state's education system, including its financing structure, on ground 
that it violated equality and quality requirements derived from the state constitution's edu­
cation clause); Massachusetts, see McDuffy v. Secretary of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 
1993) (holding that property-tax based financing scheme violated state education clause, 
which requires the state to "cherish" the public schools); Montana, see Helena Elementary, 
769 P.2d at 690 {holding that substantial funding disparities violated state education clause, 
which guarantees equal educational opportunities); New Hampshire, see Claremont Sch. 
Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) {holding that financing scheme violated state 
constitution's education and taxation clauses); New Jersey, see Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 
359 (N.J. 1990) ("Abbott II") (holding that revised funding scheme still violated the state 
education clause); Ohio, see DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (holding that 
school finance scheme did not guarantee adequate education and therefore violated state 
education clause); Tennessee, see Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 
(Tenn. 1993) (holding that state finance scheme, which resulted in funding disparities and 
was justified only by local control of education, violated rational basis test derived from state 
equal protection clause); Texas, see Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 
(Tex. 1989) ("Edgewood I") (holding that finance scheme violated state's "efficient system" 
education clause, which the court interpreted to require substantially equal access to educa­
tion funding); Vermont, see Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997) (holding that school 
finance scheme violated state equal protection and education provisions, which guarantee 
substantial equality of educational opportunity). 
71. Challenges were rejected by the following state supreme courts: Florida, see Coali­
tion for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1996) (reject­
ing challenge on ground that judicial interference with school funding would violate separa­
tion of powers doctrine); Illinois, see Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (111. 1999) 
{holding that state education clause does not guarantee minimally adequate education); 
Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1 178 (Ill. 1996) (rejecting challenge based 
on state education and equal protection clauses); Maine, see School Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Commissioner, Dept. of Educ., 659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995) (holding that finance scheme did 
not violate state constitution's equal protection guarantee); Minnesota, see Skeen v. State, 
505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (rejecting challenge to financing scheme based on state equal 
protection and education clauses); Nebraska, see Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993) 
{dismissing claims that spending disparities violated state constitutional rights on grounds 
that plaintiffs failed to allege that disparities caused educational inadequacies); North 
Dakota, see Bismark Pub. Sch. Dist. #1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994) (finding by a 
majority vote that finance scheme violated state equal protection clause, but upholding 
scheme because supermajority necessary to strike down legislation as unconstitutional); 
Oregon, see Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991) (re­
jecting challenges based on state constitutional provisions on grounds that recent constitu­
tional amendment regulating local property taxation presupposes use of local revenues to 
fund schools); Rhode Island, see City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I, 1995) 
(holding that finance scheme did not violate either education clause or equal protection pro-
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All told, then, eighteen state supreme courts have struck down 
their respective states' school finance schemes, while eighteen have 
upheld their states' schemes.73 Of the eighteen successful cases, only a 
single one - in New Jersey - was brought by predominantly minority 
urban districts.74 Two others, in Arizona75 and Texas,76 were brought 
vision of state constitution); Virginia, see Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994) 
(holding that state constitution does not mandate substantially equal school funding); Wis­
consin, see Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (rejecting challenge based on state 
equal protection and education clauses and holding that education is a fundamental right but 
equal funding is not). 
72. At least four of the victories, however, came in cases based on equality rather than 
adequacy theories. See Brigham, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Helena Elementary, 769 P.2d 684 
(Mont. 1989); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys., 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood I, 777 
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
73. See supra notes 64-66 and 70-71, for a complete list of state supreme court decisions. 
It is worth noting that in three of the states where school finance litigation was initially un­
successful, second-round suits have met with some limited success. The Supreme Courts of 
New York, North Carolina, and South Carolina upheld their respective state financing 
schemes against "equity" challenges. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 
1982); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), ap­
peal dismissed for lack of substantial constitutional question, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); 
Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 {S.C. 1988). In each of these three states, 
however, the supreme courts have allowed subsequent adequacy challenges to go forward, 
and litigation is still pending in lower courts. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 
655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) {allowing plaintiffs to go forward in case claiming that school 
finance scheme denies students the right to a minimally adequate education and violates Ti­
tle VI); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997) {holding that students have a constitu­
tional right to a sound, basic education and allowing suit to proceed); Abbeville County Sch. 
Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 {S.C. 1999) (reversing dismissal of complaint and holding that 
state constitution guarantees minimally adequate education). 
74. See Abbott II, 575 A2d at 387 (noting that 71 % of state's minorities were educated 
in plaintiff districts, which were themselves predominantly minority). 
75. See Roosevelt Elementary. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994). 
The National Center for Education Statistics provides data on the racial and ethnic composi­
tions of all school districts nationwide. See School District Data Book Profiles: 1989-1990 
(visited Mar. 22, 1999) <http://govinfo.kerr.orst.edu/sddb-stateis.html> [hereinafter School 
District Data Book]. Data on relevant school districts was obtained by identifying the plain­
tiff school districts, usually through a court decision, and then looking up the districts' demo­
graphics in the Data Book Profiles. For ease of reference, I will cite to the decisions and the 
Data Book for the relevant demographic figures. In the Arizona case, 'the lead plaintiff was 
the Roosevelt School District, which is 68% Hispanic, 24% black, and 8% white. Additional 
plaintiff districts were also predominantly Hispanic. See Roosevelt, 877 P.2d. at 806; School 
District Data Book, supra, at Arizona. 
76. The Texas litigation was filed by 68 school districts. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 
391-92. Although the lead plaintiff district, Edgewood, was a predominantly white rural dis­
trict, the majority of districts apparently were predominantly black or Hispanic. See 
SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 20, at 23 (noting that "evidence in the record indi­
cated that the plaintiffs, property-poor districts, had high concentrations of black and His­
panic and low-income children"). The fact that Edgewood was brought by a coalition not 
entirely composed of minority districts could justify classifying this case as one involving a 
mixed coalition rather than minority districts. But given that most of ·the districts were mi­
nority, and given the relation between ethnicity and school district poverty, of which there 
was evidence in the court record, it seems appropriate to classify this as a case brought and 
won by minority districts. See id. {"The record in Edgewood further indicated that Mexi­
can-Americans comprised 95 percent of students in the poorest Texas districts, although 
they were only 30 percent of the total enrollment statewide."). 
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by suburban and rural minority districts. And a fourth, in Washing­
ton, was brought by an integrated urban district - Seattle.77 
The majority of successful challenges were brought by suburban or 
rural white districts, in states such as West Virginia,78 Wyoming,79 
Connecticut,80 Arkansas,81 Kentucky,82 Montana,83 Tennessee,84 New 
Hampshire,85 Idaho,86 and Vermont.87 In Massachusetts, the challenge 
was brought by a coalition of sixteen rural and urban districts (ex­
cluding Boston); thirteen were predominantly white, and three were 
77. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d. 71, 78 (Wash. 1978) (identifying plain­
tiff district); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Washington (reporting statistics on 
demographics of plaintiff district). 
78. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 861 (W. Va. 1979) (identifying plaintiffs as par­
ents of children attending public schools of Lincoln County); School District Data Book, su­
pra note 75, at West Virginia, Lincoln County (reporting statistics on the racial composition 
of the Lincoln County District). 
79. See Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 310, 317 (Wyo. 
1980) (identifying three districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at 
Wyoming (reporting statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved). 
80. The Connecticut litigation was initially brought by Canton, a predominantly white, 
rural district. See Horton I, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); School District Data Book, supra 
note 75, at Connecticut, Canton School District. In Horton I, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court struck down the state's finance scheme. Plaintiffs were not satisfied with the subse­
quent legislative response and returned to court. See Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099 
(Conn. 1985) ("Horton II"). Lower courts allowed Hartford - a predominantly minority, 
urban district-to intervene, a decision which was upheld by the supreme court. See id. In 
the same decision, the supreme court also upheld the legislative response and rejected Can­
ton and Hartford's challenge. See id. 
81. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ark. 1983) (listing eleven 
plaintiff school districts); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Arkansas (reporting 
statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved). 
82 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989) (identi­
fying districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Kentucky (reporting 
statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved). 
83. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 684 (Mont. 1989) 
(identifying districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Montana (re­
porting statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved). 
84. See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. 1993) 
(identifying districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Tennessee (re­
porting statistics on racial composition of the school districts involved); see also Lewis R. 
Donelson, School Finance Litigation: A Rural Perspective, 61 TENN. L. REV. 445 (1994). 
85. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Claremont Sch. 
Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1377 (N.H. 1993) (identifying districts involved). New 
Hampshire has no majority minority districts. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 202-03. 
86. See Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 728 (Idaho 
1993) (identifying districts involved). Idaho has no majority minority school districts. See 
School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Idaho. 
87. See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). Vermont has no majority minority 
school districts. See School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Vermont. 
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predominantly Hispanic.88 In two states, Alabama89_ and California,90 
challenges were brought on behalf of all school children not receiving 
a constitutionally sufficient education. And in a third state, Ohio, the 
successful plaintiff was a huge coalition of 553 districts.91 
On the other side of .the ledger, in the eighteen states where plain­
tiffs were unsuccessful, there were nineteen relevant cases all told -
with the Illinois Supreme Court twice rejecting school finance suits.92 
Of the nineteen cases, seven were brought either exclusively by urban 
minority districts, or by a small group of plaintiffs that included at 
least one urban minority district. New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
Milwaukee, East St. Louis (lli.), Providence, and Richland County 
(S.C.) all sued and lost.93 Predominantly Hispanic suburban and rural 
districts filed an unsuccessful case in Colorado, and a predominantly 
minority (African-American and Native American) rural district lost a 
school finance challenge in North Carolina.94 Four of the other ten 
88. See McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ, 615 N.E.2d 516, 516 (Mass. 
1993) (identifying school districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at 
Massachusetts (reporting statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved). 
89. See Ex parte James, 713 So.2d 869, 872 (Ala. 1997) (consolidating seven lawsuits 
brought by a coalition of 25 school systems and a statewide class of all children enrolled in 
those public schools providing less than a minimally adequate education). 
90. See Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (identifying plaintiff class); see also 
RICHARD F. ELMORE & MlLBREY WALLIN MCLAUGHLIN, REFORM AND RETRENCH­
MENT: THE PoLmcs OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (1982). 
91. The case was filed by the Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy, which "repre­
sent[ed] the 553 school systems that [were] party to the lawsuit." Mark Skertic, School 
Funding System Faces Big Test, CIN. ENQUIRER, Sept. 9, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 
2258946; see also DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 777 (Ohio 1997). It is worth noting that 
the first suit challenging the Ohio finance scheme was unsuccessful. See Board of Educ. of 
Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1999). That case was brought by students, par­
ents, and administrators in the Cincinnati School District. See id. at 815. 
92 See Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999); Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 
N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996). Two additional "school finance" cases were rejected by the Illinois 
Supreme Court but are not included here because they only tangentially touched on the is­
sue and the court did not address the constitutionality of the entire funding scheme. The 
first, People ex rel Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. 1976), was a suit brought by the state 
to collect taxes on farmers. In their defense, the farmers argued, inter alia, that the school 
funding formula was unconstitutional, but they failed to offer any proof. The Illinois Su­
preme Court rejected the claim "[b]ecause of this failure of proof." Id. at 775-76. The sec­
ond, Blase v. Illinois, 302 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973), involved a claim that the state must pay at 
least 50% of education costs, which the court rejected. 
93. See Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Kukor v. Grover, 436 
N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 
662 A.2d 40, 44 (R.I. 1995); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988). 
Richland County, which includes Columbia, is predominantly urban. See School District 
Data Book, supra note 75, at South Carolina, Richland County; see also School District Data 
Book, supra note 75 (providing relevant statistics on racial composition of district). 
94. See Lujan v. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo. 1982); Britt v. North 
Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), appeal dismissed for lack 
of substantial constitutional question, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987). In Colorado, plaintiffs were 
a group of 16 school districts: Alamosa, Center, Del Norte, Delta East Otero, Granada, 
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losing cases were filed by mainly rural white districts - in Georgia,95 
Nebraska,96 Virginia,97 and North Dakota.98 Five were brought by 
fairly large coalitions of mainly white rural and suburban districts - in 
Oregon,99 Oklahoma,100 Minnesota,101 Florida,102 and Maine.103 And 
one, finally, was brought by a large coalition of school districts in Illi­
nois, which included rural white districts and urban minority districts, 
such as East St. Louis and Chicago.104 
Ignacio, Johnstown, Mazanola, Monte Vista, Montezuma, Montrose, Pueblo, Rocky Ford, 
South Conejos, and Trinidad. Eight of these were predominantly Hispanic, and another four 
were over 35% Hispanic. See School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Colorado (statis­
tics on the racial composition of the school districts involved). One of the attorneys involved 
in the case stated that the attorneys specifically sought out Hispanic districts as plaintiffs. 
See Interview with David Long, Attorney for Plaintiffs (Feb. 26, 1998). In North carolina, 
the challenge was brought by students and parents in the Robeson County School District, 
see Britt, 357 S.E.2d at 432, which was 28% African-American and 44% Native American. 
See School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Robeson County. 
95. See McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157 (Ga. 1981) {identifying school districts 
involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Georgia (reporting statistics on racial 
composition of the relevant school districts); 
96. See Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 350 {Neb. 1993) {identifying districts involved); 
see also School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Nebraska (reporting statistics on the 
racial composition of the school districts involved). 
97. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 139 n.2 {Va. 1994) {identifying districts 
involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Virginia (reporting statistics on the 
racial composition of the school districts involved). 
98. See Bismark Pub. Sch. Dist. #1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 247 (N.D. 1994) (identifying 
districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at North Dakota (reporting 
statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved). 
99. See Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116, 117 n.1 {Or. 
1991) (stating that a coalition of 55 districts sued the state). There are no majority-minority 
districts in Oregon, and Portland, the one large urban district, is "one of the state's wealtltier 
districts." See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 230; see also School District Data Book, su­
pra note 75, at Oregon. 
100. See Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1137-38 {Okla. 1987) (noting that 
plaintiffs represented boards of education and students in 38 districts). According to Plain­
tiff/Appellant's Brief, on file witlt autltor, plaintiff districts included a few urban districts. 
Aside from Tulsa, however, which enrolls over 40,000 students, the districts classified as "ur­
ban" are quite small - Norman and Sand Springs, for example, are "urban" districts, but 
enroll only 12,000 and 5,000 students respectively. See School District Data Book, supra note 
75, at Oklahoma, at Tulsa, Norman, and Sand Springs Districts . 
101. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 301, 302 (Minn. 1993) {describing 76 districts 
involved). 
102. See Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 
400, 402 n.1 {Fla. 1996) {identifying districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 
75, at Florida (reporting statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved). 
103. See School Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Commissioner, Dept. of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 855 
(Me. 1995) (stating that 83 districts sued the state). Maine has no majority minority districts. 
See School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Maine. 
104. See Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996). Ninety­
seven districts were involved in the case. See id. at 1180. According to one of plaintiffs' at­
torneys, the districts included botlt rural white and urban minority districts, such as Chicago 
and East St. Louis. See Telephone Interview witlt Patricia Brannan, Attorney for Plaintiff 
(Sept. 20, 1999). 
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B. Assessing the Evidence 
In sum, predominantly minority districts have won only three of 
the twelve school finance challenges (25%) in which they were plain­
tiffs. Predominantly white districts, by contrast, have won eleven of 
fifteen cases (73 % ) if one excludes the cases involving large coalitions 
of districts, or twelve of twenty (60%) if one includes the five cases in­
volving large coalitions of districts, most of which were predominantly 
white. While the different levels of success - 25% for minority dis­
tricts versus 73 % or 60% for white districts - seem significant in 
themselves, perhaps the most revealing evidence comes from isolating 
the performance of urban minority districts. In the eight states in 
which urban minority districts have been plaintiffs, only one state su­
preme court has overturned the state's financing scheme, for a success 
rate of 12.5%. 
It is safe to say, then, that minority districts have not fared par­
ticularly well in court and that urban minority districts have fared es­
pecially poorly. Although other factors aside from the racial composi­
tion obviously could explain the results, it is possible at least to reject 
one alternative explanation: constitutional text. Education provisions 
in state constitutions differ in their formulation; some guarantee the 
right to a "thorough and efficient" education,105 others the right to a 
"general and uniform" education,106 and still others the right to an 
education described by one or a combination of the four terms thor­
ough, efficient, general, and uniform.107 Some commentators have 
suggested that the constitutional text is determinative in school fi-
105. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art VIII, § 1 ("The General Assembly . . .  shall by Law es­
tablish throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools . . . .  "); 
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 'll  ("The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and sup­
port of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools . . . .  "). 
106. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. XIIl, § 1 ("[I]t is the duty of the legislature to establish 
a general and uniform system of public schools."); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("The Legisla­
tive Assembly shall provide by law for the establishment of a uniform, and general system of 
Common schools."). 
107. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("The general assembly shall, as soon as practi­
cable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of 
free public schools . . . .  "); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("The General Assembly shall provide for 
the establishment and maintenance of a general and efficient system of free public 
schools . . • .  "); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("Adequate provision shall be made by law for a 
uniform system of free public schools . . . .  "). Other state constitutions simply call for the 
establishment of public schools. See, e.g., HA w. CONST. art X, § 1 ("The State shall provide 
for the establishment, support and control of a statewide system of public schools . . . .  "); 
ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256 ("The legislature shall establish, organize and maintain a lib­
eral system of public schools."). 
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nance cases,108 but even a brief comparison of the cases belies this as­
sertion.109 
The constitutions of New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
and West Virginia, for example, all guarantee the right to a "thorough 
and efficient" education.110 Suffice it to say that the outcomes of 
school finance cases in these states, as well as the courts' interpreta­
tions of what this vague constitutional language requires, have differed 
significantly.111 Similarly, the strength or specificity of the constitu­
tional language does not correspond with the outcomes in cases. The 
Georgia Supreme Court, for example, held that the education clause 
contained in the Georgia Constitution, which explicitly provides that 
"an adequate education" shall be "a primary obligation of the State,'' 
does not create a judicially enforceable right.112 The Massachusetts 
Supreme Court, on the other hand, interpreted its state education 
clause - which admonishes the state to "cherish . . .  public schools" -
to impose upon the Legislature a duty to provide all students an ade­
quate education, the components of which the court listed in detail.113 
To the considerable extent that constitutional text is not responsi­
ble for the different outcomes in school finance cases, non-textual ex­
planations obviously increase in importance.114 One explanation 
108. See, e.g., Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform 
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 309 n.3 {1991) ("The language of the education arti­
cle plays a primary role in its interpretation."). 
109. Other commentators, and at least one court, have reached the same conclusion. 
See, e.g., Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Re· 
form Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 V AND. L. REV. 129, 153-54 (1992) ("This lack of any 
discernible relationship between the strength of commitment to education in the state consti­
tution and the success rate of school finance challenges makes it clear that the outcome of 
these cases does not depend on the interpretation of the constitution involved."); William E. 
Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 
ED. LAW REP. 19, 22 {1993) (acknowledging that "the distinctions between education 
clauses apparently have not made a difference in those school finance cases decided between 
1973 and 1992," but suggesting that "there is no reason why the language of the educational 
clauses should not be an important factor in future school finance cases"); Hornbeck v. 
Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 777-80 {Md. 1983) (canvassing the text of edu­
cation clauses and the resulting school finance decisions from other states). 
110. See NJ. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 'l!l; MD CONST. art. VIII, §1; PENN. CONST. art 3, § 
14; Omo CONST. art. VI, § 2; w. v A. CONST. art. 12, § 1. 
111. See Abbott II, 575 A2d 359 {NJ. 1990) (overturning finance scheme); Hornbeck v. 
Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983) (upholding finance scheme); Dan­
son v. Casey, 359 A.2d 360 (Penn. 1979) (upholding finance scheme); DeRolph v. State, 677 
N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1979) (overturning finance scheme); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 f.>V. 
Va. 1979) (overturning finance scheme). 
112. McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 166 (Ga. 1981). 
113. McDuffy v. Secretary of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 526, 554 (Mass. 1993). 
114. See Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 459, 468 (1996). Professor Kahn argues that it is "hard to find significant differences 
among the cases to explain the outcomes. Outcomes do not seem to depend upon differ­
ences in the state programs. Nor are the different outcomes explained by differences in con-
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worth consideration and further study is the racial composition of the 
litigating school district.115 There may indeed be alternative explana­
tions as to why urban minority districts almost never win school fi­
nance cases, while rural and suburban white districts win such cases 
more often than not. But race cannot be dismissed out of hand as a 
possible explanation of disparate court results, given the low rate of 
success among minority districts as compared to that among white dis­
tricts. As described presently, neither can race be dismissed as incon­
sequential with regard to legislative responses to court decisions. 
ill. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
Court-ordered changes in school finance schemes entail increasing 
education expenditures overall, redistributing existing resources, or 
both. It is therefore not surprising that court decisions declaring 
school finance systems unconstitutional typically provoke some con­
troversy and legislative opposition.116 This Part assesses whether there 
is any noticeable difference in either the degree of opposition or the 
quality of the legislative response when minority districts prevail in 
court. Measuring legislative recalcitrance is necessarily an imprecise 
endeavor, and, as with court decisions, there are a number of potential 
reasons why legislatures might actively oppose or remain unresponsive 
to court orders. But just as with court decisions, there is again a dis-
stitutional text, history, or some legal measure of the importance of education within each 
state." Id. 
115. Another possible explanation is that the type of district matters most: the cases 
indicate that urban districts do poorly and suburban or rural districts do relatively well in 
school finance litigation. The difficulty with this explanation is that it is usually impossible to 
disentangle race from the type of district involved - i.e., urban districts are typically minor­
ity, and suburban or rural districts are typically white. Only one case was brought by an in­
tegrated urban district - Seattle, Washington - and there plaintiffs prevailed. Similarly, 
only four cases were brought by rural or suburban minority districts; two, in Texas and Ari­
zona, were successful, and two, in Colorado and North Carolina, were unsuccessful. See su­
pra notes 75, 76, and 94 for citation and discussion of these cases. This limited evidence 
points in different directions: rural and suburban minority districts were obviously more 
successful, in terms of percentages, than were urban minority districts, but so too were inte­
grated urban districts. The mixed results, combined with the fact that the sample of cases is 
so small, makes it difficult to draw inferences. Whether racial composition or urbanicity is 
more significant, therefore, cannot be resolved from this admittedly crude approach of tal­
lying wins and losses. 
116. Part of the opposition is all but invited by the court decisions, which often wax 
grandiloquent in describing the rights involved and wane to the point of silence when it 
comes to specifying a remedy. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A 
Federal Courts Perspective on the State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 544 
(1994) (describing how "state supreme courts show [a] pattern of expansive declarations of 
right and duty coupled with an insistence tha! solutions must come from the legislative 
rather than the judicial branch"); Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies in 
State Courts, 104 HARV. L REV. 1072, 1072 (1991) (arguing that "legislative inertia and un­
warranted judicial deference to political branches in the remedial phase hinder the school 
finance plaintiff's prospects for securing a constitutional remedy"). 
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cernible pattern in legislative responses: minority districts that were 
successful in court faced protracted legislative battles that were more 
intense and longer-lasting than those typically faced by successful 
white districts. In addition, existing research regarding two of the 
states where school finance challenges were won by minority districts 
- New Jersey and Texas - suggests that significant segments of the 
public viewed subsequent legislative reforms in racial terms, regardless 
of the actual scope and targets of those reforms, and that whites and 
minorities differed significantly in their support of or opposition to 
equalization efforts. I will begin with the experience of minority dis­
tricts, and then move on to contrast this experience with that of a 
number of white districts. 
A. When Minority Districts Win in Court 
Predominantly minority districts have successfully challenged 
school finance systems in three states - New Jersey, Texas, and 
Arizona. In each of the three states, which I will discuss in tum, pro­
tracted legislative battles ensued, prompting numerous returns to 
court. In New Jersey, the court and legislative battles over school fi­
nance reform have been ongoing for over twenty-five years and are by 
now legendary.117 There have been two different cases, Robinson v. 
Cahill and Abbott v. Burke, but they are both of a single piece. 
The Robinson litigation began in 1970. In 1973, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court issued its first decision in the case, finding that the 
state's system of public school funding violated the constitutional 
guarantee of a "thorough and efficient" education.118 The case went 
before the supreme court on six additional occasions, primarily be­
cause the Legislature refused to comply with the court's order to ame­
liorate the disparities caused by the state's finance system.119 The 
Legislature finally enacted the Public School Education Act of 1975 
("Education Act" or "Act"), which the court upheld as facially valid.120 
117. The literature on the New Jersey case is large and grows with each new supreme 
court decision. See, e.g., RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE PoLmcs OF 
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (1978); Tractenberg, supra note 36; Paul L. Tractenberg, The 
Evolution and Implementation of Educational Rights Under the New Jersey Constitution of 
1947 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibil­
ity Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 
179 (1996). 
118. See Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
119. See Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) 
("Robinson II); Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975) ("Robinson III''); Robinson v. 
Cahill, 351 A2d 713 (NJ. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975) ("Robinson IV"); 
Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) ("Robinson V"); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 
457 (NJ. 1976) ("Robinson VI"); Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) ("Robinson 
VII"). 
120. See Robinson V, 355 A.2d at 139. 
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But the Legislature subsequently failed to fund the Education Act, de­
spite a court order (with a deadline) to do so.121 The court then 
threatened to close the schools.122 Only after the court carried through 
with its threat and closed the schools for eight days (albeit during the 
summer), did the Legislature fund the Act - by passing a statewide 
income tax.123 An order lifting the injunction that closed the schools 
was the court's last act in the Robinson litigation.124 
The Abbott litigation began in 1981. Students from four poor, .ur­
ban minority districts - Camden, East Orange, Irvington, and Jersey 
City - challenged the constitutionality of the Education Act as ap­
plied, arguing that it did not sufficiently ameliorate the disparities be­
tween poor and wealthy districts.125 After first remanding the case to 
an Administrative Law Judge to develop a record, the supreme court 
agreed with plaintiffs and held that the Act was unconstitutional as 
applied not only to the four original districts, but also as applied to 24 
other poor urban districts in the state.126 A thorough and efficient 
education, the court held, is "that educational opportunity which is 
needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a 
citizen and as a competitor in the labor market," which means, the 
court continued, "that poorer disadvantaged students must be given a 
chance to be able to compete with relatively advantaged students."127 
The Act did not ensure that opportunity, and the court ordered that 
the Legislature provide substantial equality in funding between the 28 
Abbott districts and the wealthiest suburban districts.128 The court also 
ordered the state to devote additional funding to the Abbott districts 
to support programs to address the "special educational needs of these 
poorer urban districts."129 
This time, and much to its later regret, the Legislature and Demo­
cratic Governor Florio moved quickly and enacted the Quality Educa­
tion Act ("QEA"). The QEA increased funding not only for poor ur­
ban districts, but for the vast majority of school districts. The QEA 
also required property-rich �chool districts to shoulder the burden of 
121. See Robinson VI, 358 A.2d at 457; see also Brown, supra note 117, at 191-92. 
122 See Robinson VI, 358 A.2d at 457; LEHNE, supra note 117, at 156-63. 
123. See LEHNE, supra note 117, at 160-63. 
124. See Robinson VII, 360 A.2d at 400. 
125. See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 455 (N.J. 1998) ("Abbott V"). 
126. See id. 
127. See Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 372 (NJ. 1990) (citing Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273, 295 
(N.J. 1973)). 
128. See Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 408 ("We find that in order to provide a thorough and 
efficient education in these poorer urban districts, the State must assure that their educa­
tional expenditures per pupil are substantially equivalent to those of the more affluent sub­
urban districts . . . .  "). 
129. See id. 
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teacher pension payments.130 Despite the wide dispersion of funds 
that would have actually occurred under the QEA - school districts 
enrolling 85% of the state's students would have benefited - public 
opposition to the QEA was intense and widespread.131 Part of the op­
position crune from the largest teachers' organization, which opposed 
the handling of pension payments, and part came from a grassroots 
anti-tax group. Another portion of the opposition, however, stemmed 
from the (incorrect) public perception that the QEA would primarily 
benefit poor, minority urban districts, an opposition that some com­
mentators suggest "was fueled by the fact that minority children from 
poorer urban districts were plaintiffs in the litigation."132 
In response to the opposition, the Legislature quickly amended the 
QEA. As a result, the poorest urban districts received only $287 mil­
lion of the $800 million in new state aid distributed under the revised 
QEA.133 Because the runended QEA left a large gap between the 
Abbott districts and the wealthy suburban districts, plaintiffs returned 
to court. In 1994, in Abbott III, the court found the statute unconstitu­
tional as applied to the Abbott districts, both because it failed to assure 
parity and because it failed to provide supplemental programs to assist 
disadvantaged students.134 The court established yet another deadline 
by which the Legislature had to assure parity of funding.135 And the 
Legislature yet again ignored the deadline. When it finally did act in 
December 1996, it enacted legislation that made no attempt to achieve 
parity between the Abbott districts and the suburban districts; instead, 
the legislation substantively defined a "thorough and efficient" educa­
tion and, using figures generated from a hypothetical district and com­
puter model, provided the funds allegedly necessary to support that 
education. 
In 1997, in Abbott IV, sixteen years after the start of the Abbott 
litigation and twenty-seven years after the start of the Robinson litiga­
tion, the court struck down the legislation and reinforced its earlier 
130. See Brown, supra note 117, at 196. 
131. See, e.g., id. at 197; Reed, supra note 3, at 209; Douglas S. Reed, The People v. The 
Court: School Finance Refonn and the New Jersey Supreme Court, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. 
POL'Y 137 (1994). 
132. Brown, supra note 117, at 196-97; see also MARGARET E. GOER1Z, THE ROCKY 
ROAD TO SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 2 (Center for Educ. Pol'y Analysis Jan. 1993). As 
Douglas Reed has explained, "Governor Jim Florio designed the QEA (along with property 
tax rebates) to aid a broad range of lower-class and middle-class districts. The problem was 
that no one believed him." Reed, supra note 3, at 209. Thus, "[d]espite the pledges that 
middle and lower class districts would benefit under the new school finance regime - and 
budget allocations that fulfilled those pledges - middle class New Jerseyans quite literally 
took to the streets (and to the talk radio airwaves) to voice their opposition." Id. 
133. See Brown, supra note 117, at 197-98. 
134. See Abbott v. Burke, 643 A2d 575 (NJ. 1994) ("Abbott Ill"). 
135. See id. 
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order requiring parity.136 A year later, in Abbott V, the court - in its 
twelfth and most recent school finance decision - approved various 
additional programs for the Abbott districts.137 At the moment, the 
Legislature appears to be complying with the court's latest orders to 
achieve parity and to fund additional programs. But given the Legisla­
ture's intense opposition throughout this saga, it is likely that the cur­
rent repose is only temporary. Indeed, there is evidence that the Leg­
islature is continuing to explore alternatives to parity in an effort to 
get out from under the court's remedy.138 
The Texas school finance saga has been less protracted than New 
Jersey's, but it still has been a long and complicated battle.139 The 
Texas Supreme Court first struck down Texas's financing scheme in 
1989, on the ground that the funding disparities created and tolerated 
by the scheme were not "efficient" as required by the state constitu­
tion.140 The Legislature responded the next year by enacting legisla­
tion that the supreme court struck down in 1991 as insufficient; the 
court criticized the legislation for failing to "restructure the [financing] 
system."141 Then the litigation took an odd tum. The Legislature en­
acted legislation creating 188 county education districts ("CEDs"), 
solely for tax purposes; the idea was to group property-rich and prop­
erty-poor districts together and have the former support the latter. 
Despite the fact that the Legislature certainly restructured the finance 
system, the supreme court struck this new scheme down on the ground 
that it created an unconstitutional ad valorem tax.142 
The Legislature then proposed a constitutional amendment that 
would allow for the creation of CEDs to levy, collect, and distribute 
the taxes.143 Opponents dubbed the financing scheme and the neces­
sary amendment the "Robin Hood" plan, because it involved recap­
turing money from the wealthier districts and redistributing it to the 
136. See Abbott W, 693 A.2d 417 (NJ. 1997). 
137. See Abbott V, 710 A.2d 450 (NJ. 1998). 
138. See, e.g., David P. Rebovich, School Tab Threatens Whitman's Blueprint, 7 N.J. 
LAW. 211 (1998); Author's Interviews with David Sciarra, Legal Director, Education Law 
Center, Newark, NJ (counsel for Abbott plaintiffs) (Feb. 3 & 10, 1998). 
139. See Mark G. Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 499 (1991) (remarking, in the context of discussing the Texas cases, 
that school finance reform "is like a Russian novel: it's long, tedious, and everybody dies in 
the end"). 
140. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W .2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989). 
141. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1991) ("Edgewood 
II"). 
142 See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 
826 S.W .2d 489, 524 (Tex. 1992) ("Edgewood III"). 
143. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W.2d 450, 460 (Tex. 1995) 
("Edgewood V"). 
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poorer ones.144 Voters in tum rejected the constitutional amendment 
by a wide margin - 63 percent to 27 percent.145 The state then en­
acted legislation that capped property values at $280,000 per pupil. 
Districts with property wealth above that amount must choose one or 
a combination of the following options: consolidate (physically or fi­
nancially) with another district, detach territory for tax purposes, write 
the state a check, or educate nonresident students.146 The financing 
scheme itself is two-tiered, with a foundation grant (tier one) that 
guarantees a set amount per pupil at a given tax rate, and a guaran­
teed yield plan (tier two) that guarantees an additional amount of 
funding per pupil for every additional cent in taxes above the mini­
mum required for the foundation grant.147 
In 1995, the Texas Supreme Court upheld this legislation against 
challenges brought by property-poor districts (who objected to the fact 
that the legislation does not eliminate all disparities), as well as those 
brought by property-rich districts (who objected to the cap on prop­
erty values).148 Although this plan has existed for three years, its long­
term stability is questionable. The Legislature debated competing 
proposals in 1997 either to eliminate the funding formula altogether or 
to raise the cap on assessed values, in order to reduce the "Robin 
Hood" effect of the current system.149 The issue will be revisited in 
1999, when the biennial legislature next convenes.150 
The litigation in Arizona is in its infancy by comparison to that in 
New Jersey and Texas, but it is already beginning to resemble its more 
mature companions. The plaintiff districts in Arizona are predomi­
nantly Hispanic, and in 1994, the Arizona Supreme Court invalidated 
the state's system of funding school facilities.151 The court found that 
this aspect of the state's finance scheme, which relies primarily on lo­
cal property taxes, caused "gross disparities" and created "inadequate 
educational opportunities."152 The Legislature's first two responses 
were declared insufficient by the supreme court.153 In a move reminis­
cent of the New Jersey litigation, the supreme court then threatened 
144. See Douglas S. Reed, Court-Ordered School Finance Equalization: Judicial Activ­
ism and Democratic Opposition 10 (National Ctr. for Educ. Statistics Rep. 97-535) (last 
modified July 23, 1997) <http://nces.ed.gov/pubs97/97535g.html>. 
145. See id. 
146. See Edgewood V, 893 S.W.2d at 461. 
147. See id. 
148. See id. at 468-84. 
149. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 250. 
150. See id. 
151. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994). 
152 Id. at 814. 
153. See Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (Ariz. 1997). 
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to cut off all public school funding if the Legislature did not enact re­
sponsive legislation.154 
The Legislature responded to the threat and enacted a plan that 
requires the state to spend $374 million annually to build, equip, and 
maintain public schools.155 Localities will still be able to spend above 
the state grant amounts through voter-approved local tax increases. 
The plan also requires the state to set adequacy standards for the fa­
cilities and to ensure that all public schools meet those standards 
within five years.156 The plan, on its face, satisfied plaintiffs, who 
joined the state in requesting the Arizona court to declare the plan 
constitutional.157 Plaintiffs did not wish the court to close the case and 
terminate jurisdiction, however, given that the standards have not yet 
been developed.158 In mid-July, the supreme court approved the plan 
as constitutional and went ahead and terminated the case.159 Whether 
this plan will succeed in closing the gap in facilities funding will not be 
known for another year or two, and plaintiffs have suggested that they 
will consider filing another suit if the gap is not eliminated.160 
B. When White or Integrated Districts Win in Court 
Legislative recalcitrance and public opposition, to be sure, are not 
exclusive to states where minority districts succeed in court.161 A cur­
rent example of legislative wrangling following court success by white 
school districts is found in New Hampshire, where the state supreme 
court, in December 1997, struck down the state's school finance sys­
tem.162 That system relied to a larger extent than any other in the 
country on local funding, with the state share of school funding less 
154. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 102. 
155. See Hal Mattern, Court 0 Ks Students First, Closes Case, THE ARlzONA REPUBLIC, 
July 21, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Mattern, Court OKs Students First]; Hal Mattern, School­
Aid Partisans End Battle; Both Sides Petition Court for OK of Law, THE ARlzONA 
REPUBLIC, July 16, 1998, at Bl [hereinafter Mattern, School-Aid Partisans]. 
156. See Mattern, School-Aid Partisans, supra note 155, at Bl. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. 
159. See Mattern, Court OKs Students First, supra note 155, at Al. 
160. See id. (quoting the superintendent of one of the plaintiff districts, Jose Lebya, who 
stated: "I'd hate to see us' back in court in two years, but if the gap isn't closed, as plaintiffs 
we would have to evaluate whether to file another suit"). 
161. See, e.g., Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equality in Education: Deconstructing the 
Reigning Myths and Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 691, 693 (1993) 
(suggesting that "few of the plaintiff victories have resulted in reforms that have demonstra­
bly ameliorated the inequities," and that "overall, the record is disappointing"). 
162 See Oaremont Sch. Dist v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.H. 1997). 
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than 10% .163 In Claremont School District v. Governor, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court held that students have a fundamental 
right to an adequate education and agreed with plaintiffs - five white 
rural districts - that property tax rates used to generate revenue for 
schools must be imposed uniformly across the state.164 
The Legislature and the Governor worked on responses for six 
months following the decision. Two proposals - one from the Gov­
ernor and another from a state Senator - were declared insufficient 
·by the supreme court, largely because both called for continued reli­
ance upon varying real estate tax rates.165 The Legislature recessed in 
the summer of 1998 without having agreed to a plan.166 During the 
summer, Senator James M. Rubens, a Republican candidate for gov­
ernor, tried to gamer support for a constitutional amendment that 
would effectively overrule the supreme court's decision.167 And then, 
finally, on April 29, 1999, the Legislature passed a bill that relied on a 
statewide property tax to raise the revenues necessary to satisfy the 
court's ruling.168 
An older example of public opposition to a school funding decision 
comes from California, although the interpretation of events there is 
not free from uncertainty. In California, shortly after the supreme 
court ruled in the Serrano litigation that spending disparities among 
districts could not exceed $100, the voters approved Proposition 13.169 
This constitutional amendment capped local property taxes at one 
percent, rolled back property assessments, and required future state 
tax increases to be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature.170 
In a well known article, and a subsequent follow-up, William Fischel 
argued that the tax revolt was caused by the equalization decisions; 
according to Fischel, the equalized financing took away any incentive 
163. See Linda Jacobson, School Finance Ruling Raises New Tax Questions in N.H., 
EDUC. WK., Jan. 14, 1998, at 26. 
164. See Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1357-58. 
165. See Linda Jacobson, N.H. Lawmakers Go Home With No Funding Plan, EDUC. 
WK., July 8, 1998, at 20, 24. 
166. See id. at 20. 
167. See id. at 24. 
168. See Mary Ann Zohr, At Long Last, N.H. Passes School Finance Plan, EDUC. WK 
ON 1HE WEB (May 5, 1999) <http://www.edweek.org/cw/1994/34nn.nl8>. Although New 
Hampshire does demonstrate that school finance decisions in favor of white districts will cer­
tainly cause controversy in some states, it is nonetheless important to recognize that New 
Hampshire is relatively new to the school finance game. In Claremont, the court allowed the 
continuing funding system to remain in place until the end of 1998, recognizing that the 
Legislature would need a reasonable amount of time to change the system. Although the 
Legislature exceeded this time limit, and took close to a year and a half to enact responsive 
legislation, by New Jersey standards the Legislature acted quite quickly. 
169. See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-8. 
170. See CAL. CONST. art. XllIA, §§ 1, 3 (1978). 
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among property-rich districts to continue trucing themselves at high 
rates because local districts would have to forfeit some local revenue 
to the state.171 Others have disagreed with Fischel's hypothesis, argu­
ing that Proposition 13 was caused by a more generalized opposition 
to high property taxes.172 
Whatever its original cause, however, Proposition 13 has been 
devastating for the financing of California public schools, causing 
overall spending to plummet and California to drop from near the top 
in the nation in per-pupil expenditures to thirty-fifth.173 At the same 
time, disparities among districts, although originally reduced by the 
Serrano litigation, have grown in recent years. The increasing dispari­
ties are due in part to student activities fees, desegregation funding, 
developer fees, private grants, and other means of raising revenue that 
are not covered by Proposition 13 or Serrano.114 
It is thus true, as New Hampshire and California illustrate, that 
school finance decisions won by white districts have not been met with 
enthusiasm in every state. At the same time, however, recalcitrant 
states like New Hampshire and California appear to be outweighed 
(and are certainly outnumbered) by those where the legislatures have 
been quite responsive to court mandates. This latter group includes 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Vermont, Massachusetts, Washington, and ar­
guably Montana.175 I will discuss each of these states briefly and in 
turn, beginning with the poster child of this group, Kentucky. 
171. See Fischel, How Serrano, supra note 1, at 609 ("My research through scholarly 
articles, California newspapers and public documents shows that Serrano forced a legislature 
that was apparently eager to help poorer schools to adopt a particular response that was so 
far from California voters' demand for education that they brought Proposition 13 down on 
themselves." (footnote omitted)). 
172. See, e.g., REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-8 n.22 (quoting one of plaintiffs' at­
torneys in Serrano, who dismissed Fischel's argument as "silly" and suggested that the tax 
revolt resulting in Proposition 13 was a "force unto its own"). 
173. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 111. 
174. See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-10. An unusual source of additional reve­
nue exists in Beverly Hills; according to Fischel, the Beverly Hills school district "owns oil 
wells, whose revenues were not considered taxes and thus are not subject to either Serrano's 
or Proposition 13's constraints." Fischel, How Serrano, supra note 1, at 621. For discussion 
and evidence of California's school finance experience after Proposition 13, see, e.g., Bradley 
W. Joondeph, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation­
Prompted School Finance Reform, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 792-97, 813-14 (1995) (ar­
guing that school finance litigation was a "Pyrrhic" victory in California because funding for 
the poorest school districts increased at half the rate of the national average in the years af­
ter the Serrano litigation); Tractenberg, supra note 36, at 72-75, 111-20. 
175. Montana is representative of a small group of states, including West Virginia and 
Arkansas, where the legislatures were initially fairly responsive, but changes in the state 
economy combined with lack of continuing pressure for reform have stymied efforts to alle­
viate disparities or increase funding. See, e.g., REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-4, A-44 to 
A-47, A-82 to A-87; see also Martin Schoppmeyer & Tommy Venters, Arkansas' Disap­
pearing Tax Base (March 1993) (paper delivered at the American Ed. Finance Ass'n meet­
ing) (on file with author); J.L. Flanigan, West Virginia's Financial Dilemma: The Ideal 
School System in the Real World, 15 J. EDUC. FIN. 229 (1989); Quality Counts, supra note 21, 
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In 1989, in response to a suit filed by predominantly white rural 
districts, the Kentucky Supreme Court declared the state's entire sys­
tem of education (including its financing) unconstitutional.176 Less 
than a year later, the Legislature enacted a sweeping and thorough re­
form package. The legislative package, known as the Kentucky Edu­
cation Reform Act ("KERA"), both increased expenditures overall 
and reduced spending disparities.177 In only three years, state funding 
increased by $540.7 million, a 34% raise that boosted average per­
pupil expenditures by over $1,000.178 During the same time period, the 
range between high- and low-spending districts dropped by 27%.179 
KERA, which has been hailed as "the nation's most comprehensive 
experiment in educational reform," also contained innovative provi­
sions regarding school governance and accountability, created sup­
plemental programs for at-risk children, and established academic 
standards.180 
Similarly responsive, if not as far-reaching, were legislative changes 
in both Tennessee and Vermont. A group of mostly rural, predomi­
nantly white school districts filed suit in Tennessee, alleging that ex­
isting funding disparities were unconstitutional.181 Interestingly, a 
group of metropolitan and urban districts, including Nashville­
Davidson County and Memphis, intervened to contest the suit and ex­
press their opposition to having money diverted away from urban ar­
eas toward the rural districts.182 Plaintiffs won,183 but even prior to the 
at 265 (reporting that state court judge in West Virginia recently ordered Legislature again 
to equalize funding between poor and well-to-do school districts). 
176. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). Sixty-six 
poor school districts formed the Council for Better Education, and they were joined by 
seven other districts. Not among the plaintiffs was Louisville-Jefferson County. See Charles 
J. Russo, School-Based Decision Making in Kentucky: Dawn of a New Era or Nothing New 
Under the Sun?, 83 KY. LJ. 123, 123 (1995). Surprisingly, no school district in Kentucky has 
a majority black enrollment. See id. For an entertaining discussion of the litigation (and 
Kentucky history), see Bert T. Combs, Creative Constitutional Law: The Kentucky School 
Reform Law, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367 (1991). Combs, the former Governor of Kentucky, 
served as lead attorney for plaintiffs in the case. 
177. For a useful discussion of the provisions and implementation of KERA, see Jacob 
E. Adams, Jr., School Finance Policy & Students' Opportunities to Learn: Kentucky's Expe· 
rience, THE FuTuRE OF CmLDREN, Winter 1997, at 79. 
178. See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-33 to A-34; Adams, supra note 177, at 81· 
84. 
179. See Adams, supra note 177, at 81-84. 
180. See id. at 79-80. 
181. See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993). 
182 See Ernest G. Kelly, Jr., School Finance Litigation: An Urban Perspective, 61 
TENN. L. REV. 471 (1994). For insight into the rural schools' perspective and the state's per· 
spective on the case, see, respectively, Donelson, supra note 84, and Charles W. Burson & 
Jane W. Young, School Finance Litigation: The State's Perspective, 61 TENN. L. REV. 457 
(1994). 
183. See McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 141. 
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supreme court decision in 1993, the Legislature revised Tennessee's 
school finance system.184 The new formula targeted more money to 
the rural areas but required a six-year phase-in period and initially left 
out teachers' salaries as a cost that would be equalized.185 The school 
districts returned to court to challenge the new law, and in 1995, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the phase-in period was accept­
able but that teachers' salaries had to be included within the equaliza­
tion plan.186 During the last six years, rural areas have received a 
greater proportion of state increases in funding, which has served to 
close the gap in spending between rural and suburban and metropoli­
tan districts. All school districts, however, have seen some increase in 
state aid.187 Indeed, over the six-year period that the new funding 
formula has been phased in, state spending on education has increased 
by $1 billion - an 80% increase since 1992.188 The Legislature, 
moreover, does not appear anxious to alter the revised system, which 
seems to be satisfying both rural and urban districts alike.189 
In Vermont, the Legislature reacted with remarkable alacrity to a 
state supreme court ruling in February 1997, which held that the dis­
parities created by the state's reliance on local property taxes deprived 
children of their constitutional right to equal educational opportuni­
ties.190 Within four months of the ruling, the Vermont Legislature en­
acted a bill that created a new statewide property tax earmarked for 
schools, and it also provided a funding mechanism that requires 
property-wealthy districts to share locally generated funds with other 
184. See Linda G. Morra, School Finance: Three States' Experience with Equity in 
School Funding, GAO REP. HEHS-96-39, at 37 (Dec. 19, 1995). At the time that the Legis­
lature acted, a lower state court had already declared the Tennessee finance system uncon­
stitutional. The GAO Report suggests that the Legislature was motivated to act "by a po­
tential court-imposed solution." Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court in its decision 
acknowledged the passage of the new legislation, but did not rule upon it and instead de­
voted its decision to the system that existed prior to its passage. See McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 
at 147. 
, 
185. See Morra, supra note 184, at 40-46. 
186. See id. at 45-46. 
187. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 247 (reporting that a member of the state sen­
ate education committee acknowledged that the new aid targets the rural districts that 
brought the equalization suit, but also pointed out that all districts have seen their budgets 
increase). 
188. See id. 
189. See Morra, supra note 184, at 86 (reporting that "[n]early all the officials we inter­
viewed [which included a small district superintendent] indicated that the impact of new 
money on small, rural districts had been significant," allowing these districts to "provide 
educational opportunities to their students that they could not offer before"); Quality 
Counts, supra note 21, at 244 {"While urban school officials say they wouldn't mind more 
money and less regulation, most are generally satisfied with how the state treats them."). 
190. See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1994). 
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districts.191 Under the plan, the State will ensure that each student re­
ceives a little more than $5,000 in funding at a set tax rate. Localities 
can tax above the set rate and spend more than $5,000, but wealthier 
districts will have to share additional tax revenues. Thus, under the 
plan, forty-one "gold towns," many near ski resorts, will have to share 
tax revenues with 211 "receiving" towns. The Governor's press secre­
tary boasted that "no state has taken such broad steps in such a short 
amount of time as Vermont," a claim that appears accurate.192 Despite 
the quick response, the legislation is still the subject of ongoing con­
troversy and debate, with the wealthier towns objecting to what they 
call a Robin Hood approach.193 Even novelist John Irving, who lives in 
a town that would lose money under the new plan, has entered the 
fray, calling the state's plan Marxist and vowing either to open his own 
private school or leave the state.194 At the moment, however, the plan 
is in place and functioning. 
In Massachusetts and Washington, the legislatures were similarly 
quite eager to reform their state's education finance system. The Mas­
sachusetts litigation, as mentioned above, was brought by sixteen 
school districts - thirteen of which were predominantly white, and 
three of which were predominantly Hispanic.195 According to one of 
the attorneys who worked on the case, Boston was intentionally left 
out as a plaintiff, both because of the high spending in the district and 
because the attorneys believed it would have injected racial issues into 
the case, which would have been "too distracting."196 When the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the state's financing scheme 
violated the government's duty to "cherish" the schools and failed to 
191. See, e.g., Joetta L. Stack, Vt. Lawmakers Include New State Property Tax in Finance 
Plan, EDUC WK., June 25, 1997. 
192 See id. 
193. For an interesting story on the political dispute, see generally Elinor Burkett, Don't 
Tread on My Tax Rate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998 (Magazine), at 42. For an entertaining, if 
slightly inaccurate polemic against the legislation, see Amity Shlaes, Vermont Levels Its 
Schools, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1998, at A22. 
194. See Shlaes, supra note 193, at A22; Joetta Sack & Robert C. Johnson, State Journal, 
The Author and Act 60, EDUC. WK. ON TIIE WEB (June 24, 1998) 
<http://www.edweek.org/ew/1998/4/stjour.h17>. 
195. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
196. Telephone Interview with Mark D. Weisman, Esq. (counsel for plaintiffs) (Feb. 13, 
1998). Massachusetts is classified with the "white" districts, despite the inclusion of three 
predominantly Hispanic districts as plaintiffs, for three reasons. First, the vast majority (13 
of 16) plaintiff districts were predominantly white. Second, Massachusetts has traditionally 
had difficult relations between blacks and whites, as Boston's desegregation experience pain­
fully demonstrated, see, e.g., J. ANTiiONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND (1985); I am not 
aware of comparable difficulties between whites and Hispanics. Third, there is no indication 
that race or ethnicity was a factor in the litigation or legislation. Indeed, according to Mark 
Weisman, supra, plaintiffs' attorneys intentionally structured their case to avoid injecting 
racial issues into the case. 
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assure an adequate education for all students,197 legislation to reform 
the system was already sitting on the Governor's desk awaiting his sig­
nature.198 Since enacted, that legislation has increased state education 
aid by over $200 million a year for each of the last five years, raising 
the per-pupil spending in the poorest quartile of districts by 27%.199 
And the state's target of bringing all poor districts up to a "founda­
tion" level based on student population and need by the year 2000 
seems within reach.200 
Washington is difficult to classify as a true success story, and it is 
perhaps best described as an example of the unintended consequences 
that can attend school finance litigation. The Washington experience 
is nonetheless quite consistent with the thesis of this Article, insofar as 
the Legislature acted quickly in response to litigation brought by an 
integrated urban district, but enacted legislation that ultimately 
worked to the disadvantage of high minority districts. The case was 
brought by the Seattle school district, which is composed of a diverse 
mix of students. As of 1993-94, 41 % of students were white, 25% 
Asian-American, 23% African-American, 8% Hispanic, and 3% Na­
tive American.201 After the trial court declared the state's financing 
system unconstitutional in 1976, but before the supreme court af­
firmed that ruling, the state government enacted legislation that de­
fined the state's educational goals, placed a greater burden for funding 
on the state, and limited the amount that localities could spend be­
yond the state-provided amount.202 According to one commentator, 
the state government was clearly anxious to reform the finance system, 
describing the Legislature at the time as a "consensus looking for a 
solution," and contending that the judicial decision merely "added 
momentum" to the Legislature's reform plans.203 
Despite an early increase in state aid, however, in the two decades 
since the decision Washington's education spending has declined rela­
tive to other states.204 More importantly, while greater equalization 
197. See McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 
1993). 
198. See Enrich, supra note 60, at 176. 
199. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 175. 
200. See id.; see also Oare Kittredge, They Say Others' Examples Leave Room for a So­
lution Here, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 1998 (New Hampshire Weekly), at 1 (describing leg­
islative responses to school finance decisions in Massachusetts and other states). 
201. Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 262. 
202 See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-74 to A-77. 
203. See ROBERT PALAICH ET AL., STATE LEGISLATIVE VOTING AND LEADERSHIP: 
THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF SCHOOL FINANCE 233-34 (Education Governance Center 
Working Paper No. 1, 1983). 
204. Washington's average per-pupil expenditures dropped from 12th in 1979 to 25th in 
1991. See Jim Simon, The State Budget: Battle of the Bulge - Crowded Classrooms Equal a 
Financial Squeeze, SEATTLE T!MES, Mar. 22, 1993, at Al. 
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has occurred, most of the benefit has gone to rural districts.205 Ac­
cording to some accounts, the urban districts' greater needs for special 
education, bilingual education, and capital repairs have largely gone 
unmet and in fact have been hampered by the spending caps.206 In­
deed, one study indicated that the legislation has reduced the share of 
education funds going to the districts with the highest percentage of 
poor and minority students.207 
Rounding out the picture of legislative responses where successful 
suits were brought by white or integrated districts is Montana, which 
actually serves as a prototype for two other states, West Virginia and 
Arkansas. Sixty-seven predominantly white school districts,203 includ­
ing Helena and Billings, challenged Montana's finance system in 
1987.209 Relying on an explicit constitutional guarantee of equal edu­
cational opportunity, the supreme court upheld their challenge in 
1989.210 That same year, the Legislature enacted a "sweeping overhaul 
of the entire system," which included the largest single increase in 
education funding in Montana history.211 The legislation still allowed 
for significant disparities, however, which were addressed after plain­
tiffs filed another case and a coalition of rural districts initiated their 
own litigation.212 Although the new legislation did result in greater 
equalization, with rural schools receiving additional funding, it also cut 
funding for the schools by $29 million because of a state recession.213 
The two additional lawsuits were dismissed after the latest legislative 
changes, but the state trial court has retained jurisdiction to allow the 
parties to amend their pleadings to challenge the new legislation.214 
205. See REBELLET AL., supra note 45, at A-78 to A-79. 
206. See, e.g., id. at A-79. 
207. See Neil D. Theobald & Faith Hanna, Ample Provision for Whom?: The Evolution 
of State Control over School Finance in Washington, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 7 (1991). As Theobold 
and Hanna explain, prior to the equalization litigation, teachers' salaries in poor minority 
districts were about 2% above the state average. Since salaries have been equalized, the 
poor minority schools have received less money for their teachers. See id. at 24-25. 
208. Whites comprise 92% of the entire state's population; the only sizable minority 
group consists of Native Americans, who make up 6% of the population and 10% of the K-
12 student body. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 194. 
209. See Helena Sch. Dist v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989). 
210. See id. at 690. 
211. See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-44; THE JOINT INTERIM SUBCOMMITTEE 
ON SCHOOL FuNDING, 53D LEGIS., REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE REsPONSES TO REMAINING 
SCHOOL FuNDING EQUITY ISSUES (Mont. 1992) (prepared by Andrea L. Merrill). 
212 See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-45 to A-46; David Fenner, Lawsuit Re­
vised: Schools Challenge Funding Fix, THE MISSOURIAN, Aug. 20, 1993. 
213. See REBELLET AL., supra note 45, at A-47; cf. Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 194 
(reporting that the Legislature cut $50 million from the education budget). 
214. See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-47 to A-48. 
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Montana's example, like Washington's, is difficult to classify and 
provides further proof of the complexity of school finance reform. 
The Montana Legislature was prodded first by a court decision and 
then by the threat of additional litigation to make an apparently sin­
cere and good-faith effort to reform the school finance system. The 
state's poor economy, however, ultimately dwarfed the legislative re­
forms. A similar dynamic has occurred in West Virginia and Arkan­
sas, where the legislatures made attempts to equalize school spending 
in response to a court decision (and in West Virginia largely suc­
ceeded), but where the poor economies have kept overall spending 
quite low.215 Although one could not call the school finance litigation 
in these states a complete success by any stretch, the failures do not 
seem directly attributable to legislative inaction or opposition to 
school finance reform. 
C. Assessing the Evidence 
This leads to the point one can reasonably make regarding the leg­
islative responses in the states just surveyed. It is not true that court 
success by a white or integrated district will always translate into leg­
islation that equalizes and increases expenditures. But the efforts 
made in these states, and the success stories of states like Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Vermont, and Massachusetts, stand in contrast to the tenor 
of the legislative and popular responses to court decisions in states like 
New Jersey, Texas, and Arizona. The level and quality of legislative 
recalcitrance and public opposition is palpably different in the latter 
states. The New Jersey Supreme Court has had to rule twelve times in 
order to force the Legislature to comply, the Texas Supreme Court 
five, and the Arizona Supreme Court four times. In two of these 
states, the courts have had to threaten to close the schools to prompt 
legislative action. And in each of these states, the legislature and/or 
the public has openly and often fiercely opposed devoting more re­
sources to districts attended primarily by minority students.216 
The upshot of the evidence may be that school finance reform is 
typically a difficult and complicated process and that translating a 
court decision into significant equalization or increased resources will 
215. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 104-06, 265. 
216. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 102, 204-05, 252. According to a teacher from 
Phoenix, a predominantly Hispanic district, "[a] lot of the attitude is, 'It's a rat hole, so why 
pour more money down it.' " Id. at 100. In a report regarding education reform in Texas, 
Dallas was described as a scene of "bitter and open racial feuding" among blacks, whites, 
and Hispanics. Id. at 252. The same report quoted the Superintendent of Houston, who ob­
served that it is difficult to garner public support for education in city schools because "[t]he 
district educates a student population that does not resemble the adult makeup of the city 
taxpayers in ethnicity or socioeconomic levels." Id. at 252. And in New Jersey, legislators 
have generally demonstrated a stronger interest in taking over urban minority districts than 
in complying with court orders to increase expenditures in those districts. See id. at 204-05. 
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usually be a challenge. But the experiences in Texas, New Jersey, and 
Arizona suggest that reform will be particularly difficult when legisla­
tures are forced by court order to devote more resources primarily to 
minority districts. Thus, while a number of white districts may, like 
minority districts, also fail to capitalize on school finance court victo­
ries, that fact alone hardly makes school finance litigation a promising 
avenue for minority districts. 
One final note on the evidence is in order, concerning the actual 
results of the cases in New Jersey and Texas. (Arizona is excluded be­
cause the Legislature only recently enacted valid legislation). In both 
cases, spending disparities have been reduced, and in New Jersey, the 
twenty-eight urban minority districts are currently funded at the same 
level as the wealthiest suburban districts - and this in the state that 
has the highest average per-pupil expenditure. The results are impor­
tant, and they clearly run counter - at least at first glance - to my 
argument that urban minority districts do not fare particularly well in 
school finance reform. But there are three points to keep in mind 
when assessing these results, all of which help place the results in per­
spective and reduce, if not eliminate, their apparent inconsistency with 
my thesis. 
First, New Jersey and Texas are clearly exceptional cases, insofar 
as they are only two of ten states where minority districts have 
brought school finance challenges. In seven other states, the challenge 
never made it past the court, and in the eighth - Arizona - the re­
sults are not complete. Second, the results were not achieved \vithout 
extraordinarily long legislative fights and would not have been real­
ized without strong judicial leadership. There are already signs in 
both New Jersey and Texas suggesting that judicial involvement may 
not be as strong or favorable in the future.217 Third, and relatedly, 
there is no evidence that the saga will end soon in either state, as there 
is little sense that the legislatures are truly dedicated to implementing 
the court-ordered reform. On the contrary, in both New Jersey and 
Texas, there are signs of unrest and indications that the legislatures 
will revisit the issue soon. Although it is too early to predict the next 
stage in the New Jersey and Texas stories, the sense one has of the 
current situation in these states is quite different from the sense one 
has of the legislatures' dedication to school finance reform in states 
like Kentucky and Tennessee, where the court decisions were readily 
accepted and the remedies are being carried out apparently quite 
faithfully. 
217. Chief Justice Wilentz, for example, who spearheaded the earlier Abbott decisions, 
has been replaced by Deborah Poritz, who formerly was Governor Whitman's Attorney 
General. In Texas, there was some backtracking in Edgewood III and W, and there is con· 
tinuing evidence of popular discontent with the funding scheme. See YUDOF ET AL., supra 
note 36, at 648; Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 250. 
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Although the above evidence suggests that minority districts have 
faced a greater degree of legislative recalcitrance after winning in 
court, it does not necessarily follow that these districts suffered be­
cause of their racial composition. And it is certainly true that alterna­
tive explanations that do not rely on race could plausibly explain the 
legislative reactions in Arizona, New Jersey, and Texas. There are, af­
ter all, a number of factors not directly related to race that influence 
legislative attempts to reform school financing -- anti-tax sentiment 
within the state, general urban/suburban/rural power struggles, and 
the state's economy all play a role. Without discounting those factors, 
I would like to discuss in more detail the evidence gathered by Tedin 
and Reed, mentioned at the outset of the Article, which lends more 
direct support to the hypothesis that race does play a role in popular 
(and by presumption legislative) opposition to the equalization of re­
sources.218 
Tedin surveyed roughly 1,000 whites in two predominantly white 
districts near Houston, one of which would gain funds under a legisla­
tive plan then being considered and one of which would lose funds.219 
He gauged their attitudes both toward school finance reform and to­
ward blacks and Hispanics. He found first that 82% of whites as­
sumed that school finance equalization would benefit predominantly 
Hispanic districts, and 83 % believed it would also benefit predomi­
nantly black districts. Only 9% of whites surveyed thought white dis­
tricts would benefit, and 73% thought white districts would lose 
money.220 This perception was incorrect in two ways: first, some white 
districts, including one of the two districts in which the respondents 
lived, would benefit under the plan, and, second, most blacks in Texas 
live in urban areas like Houston or Dallas, which happen to be 
property-rich and not likely to be helped by school finance reform.221 
Tedin then found that hostility or prejudice toward blacks, using 
measurements developed for gauging "symbolic" or "modem" ra­
cism,222 had almost the same correlation with attitudes toward school 
218. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. 
219. The polling occurred in August 1991. At the time, the Texas Legislature had re­
cently enacted a plan that created 188 county educational districts ("CEDs"), which grouped 
together a number of school districts for financing purposes only. The CEDs had roughly 
equal property valuations, and within a CED, funds were designed to flow from wealthier 
school districts to poorer ones. See Tedin, supra note 3, at 630. 
220. See Tedin, supra note 3, at 634 n.18. 
221. See id. at 639 n.27. 
222. The idea of symbolic or modem racism stems most directly from David Sears's 
work on whites' attitudes toward busing. Sears posits that symbolic racism has replaced 
much overt racism, and that the former arises out of a general hostility toward black de­
mands for greater inclusion in the economic and political benefits of society, as well as from 
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finance equalization as did economic self-interest. In other words, 
Tedin found that a measurement indicating prejudice or hostility to­
ward blacks was just about as likely to be correlated with opposition to 
school finance equalization as was living in the district that stood to 
lose funds.223 
Reed's research, in turn, involved studying the results of a June 
1990 poll of 800 New Jersey residents about their views regarding the 
recently enacted QEA. He found that, for the population at large, 
economic self-interest (i.e., would the respondent's property taxes rise 
or fall, or would respondent's school district receive more or less state 
aid) seemed to have the greatest influence on attitudes toward the 
QEA.224 Among parents of school children, however, he found that 
the QEA was viewed largely "through racial lenses," and that neither 
the perceived effects of the QEA nor the parents' income could ex­
plain attitudes toward the QEA.225 "Instead, race was a far better pre­
dictor of support or opposition. In general, white parents were far 
more likely to oppose the QEA and nonwhite parents were far more 
likely to support equalization, all other variables held constant."226 In­
deed, even white parents within the 28 Abbott districts strongly op­
posed the QEA, despite the fact that their schools would receive addi­
tional funding.227 
The analyses and methodologies of Tedin and Reed assuredly 
could be criticized, as seemingly all social science studies eventually 
are, and their inquiries and sample groups are fairly limited. But 
theirs are the only studies I have found, aside from the research on 
the perception that blacks lack commitment to traditional values such as individualism, dis­
cipline, and self-reliance. See David 0. Sears, Symbolic Racism, in ELIMINATING RACISM: 
PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988); David 0. 
Sears & H.M Allen, The Trajectory of Local Desegregation Controversies and Whites' Op· 
position to Busing, in GROUPS IN CONFLICT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION 123, 
133 (Norman Miller & Marilynn B. Brewster eds., 1984). Tedin posed four questions that 
have been used in the past to measure symbolic racism, such as whether respondents agreed 
or disagreed with th� statement that "[i]t's really a matter of some people not trying hard 
enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites." Tedin, su­
pra note 3, at 635 & n.22. He then compared scores on this measurement with attitudes to· 
ward school finance reform. Needless to say, the entire concept of "symbolic racism" is con· 
troversial, as are the means of measuring it. See, e.g., Paul M. Sniderman & Philip E. 
Tetlock, Symbolic Racism: Problems of Political Motive Attribution, 42 AM. J. Soc. ISSUES 
129 (1986). To my untrained eye, the controversy seems well deserved, insofar as using four 
questions to determine if the respondent deserves to be deemed a racist - albeit a symbolic 
or modem one - appears a bit less than scientific. Nonetheless, the fact that a high score on 
the symbolic racism test explained nearly as much opposition to school equalization as did 
measurements of economic self-interest is not easily ignored. 
223. See Tedin, supra note 3, at 638, 646-47. 
224. See Reed, supra note 3, at 211. 
225. See id. at 212. 
226. Id. 
227. See id. at 211-12; see also Reed, supra note 144, at 9. 
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Proposition 13 in California, seeking to explain popular support for or 
opposition to school finance reform, and they certainly support the no­
tion that school finance reform is a racially divisive issue - even 
among whites and blacks who both stand to gain from the reform. In­
deed, their research goes beyond my argument - that minority dis­
tricts which will benefit from school finance decisions face an uphill 
legislative battle - and suggests that whites tend to perceive school 
finance reform as primarily benefiting minorities, even when inconsis­
tent with reality, and that "racial hostility" appears to play a "major 
role in explaining the level of support for the reform of school financ­
ing."228 
That minority districts will have a difficult time securing legislative 
reform, even when successful in court, is also suggested by commenta­
tors who have asserted that school finance court decisions will lead to 
legislative reform only when those decisions coincide with an existing 
political consensus in favor of reform. Under such circumstances, 
these commentators suggest, court decisions can act as a prod or shield 
for legislators who favor reform but have not acted because of fear of 
voter reaction - e.g., voter backlash over increased taxes.229 The leg­
islative successes in Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Washington bear 
out this observation; in each state, the legislature was poised to act 
even before the court decisions.230 
To the extent that this political dynamic is an accurate predictor of 
legislative responsiveness, it is not surprising that the legislatures in 
New Jersey, Texas, and Arizona have been less than anxious to divert 
228. Tedin, supra note 3, at 638. 
229. See, e.g., ELMORE & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 90; Enrich, supra note 60, at 176-
77; Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 
37 {1996); Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses and Statehouses: Educational Finance, 
Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33 LAND & WA1ER L. REv. 
281, 305-06 (1998); Kahn, supra note 114, at 468 ("Successful [school finance] litigation has 
more often been the product, not the cause, of a political consensus that the schools need 
fundamental change."). 
230. See Enrich, supra note 60, at 176-77. Enrich observes that in Kentucky, Massachu­
setts, and Washington, at the time their state supreme courts ruled, the legislatures had al­
ready "taken significant steps to transform the educational system challenged in the case." 
Id. at 176. The courts in these states, Enrich argues, thus served "as a goad or as a backstop 
to the legislature's accomplishment" Id. (footnote omitted). 
Similarly, in other states, legislatures have acted in response to litigation that ultimately 
resulted in the state financing scheme being upheld. Minnesota, for example, reformed its 
school finance system while litigation (brought by rural districts) was pending. See Morra, 
supra note 184, at 48. Notably, similar legislative action did not occur in the states where 
litigation was brought by minority districts - e.g., New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, or 
Michigan. Decades after unsuccessful school finance litigation, Michigan did reform its 
school finance system by largely dispensing with reliance on local property taxes. The ef­
fects this reform will have on poor districts, and on Detroit in particular, remain to be seen, 
and are being debated by proponents and foes of the reform. See Michael F. Addonizio et 
al., Blowing Up the System: Some Fiscal and Legal Perspectives on Michigan's School Fi­
nance Reform, 107 EDUC. LAW. REP. 15 (1996). 
476 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:432 
resources to minority districts.231 These districts simply do not have a 
great deal of political clout in their state legislatures, and it is hard to 
imagine that there was a political consensus in favor of benefiting 
them. What is true of minority districts in New Jersey, Texas, and 
Arizona seems generally true of minority districts elsewhere. It is 
therefore difficult to imagine a strong political consensus among state 
legislators to redistribute or raise resources for predominantly minor­
ity districts.232 Moreover, the public opposition to the QEA in New 
Jersey, as well as Tedin's and Reed's studies, suggest that incorporat­
ing minority districts within a larger group of beneficiaries that in­
cludes white districts may not be sufficient to overcome popular per­
ception that legislative reform will primarily assist minorities. Instead, 
it appears that this popular perception is shaped and fixed by the in­
volvement of minority districts in school finance litigation, which in 
turn creates a dynamic that only increases legislative resistance to 
school finance reform. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
It seems safe to conclude from the evidence presented here that 
minority districts do not fare as well in school finance litigation as do 
white districts, and that school finance reform is at times seen through 
a racial lens. Race thus appears to be a salient issue in school finance 
reform and litigation. This fact is significant for at least three reasons 
- one academic, one historical, and one practical. 
From a purely academic perspective, the evidence detailed in this 
Article offers additional proof that one cannot fully understand the 
dynamics and limitations of school finance reform without paying at­
tention to the dynamics of race relations in general and school deseg­
regation in particular. I suggested as much in an earlier article, and 
the evidence here bolsters that suggestion.233 School finance scholars 
seeking to make sense of the disparate outcomes in school finance liti­
gation, understand the likelihood of legislative recalcitrance, and pre­
dict future trends in school finance would do well to consider the ra­
cial composition of the school districts challenging state funding 
schemes. 
231. This dynamic is neatly demonstrated by the New Jersey Legislature's handling of 
the QEA, which ultimately devoted only a small portion of the additional state aid to the 28 
Abbott districts. See Reed, supra note 3, at 211-12. 
232 Cf. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). Massey and Denton con­
tend that residential segregation has also led to political isolation of minority districts. Be­
cause these communities are isolated geographically, the argument goes, they have a difficult 
time forming coalitions with other groups that might otherwise share common goals. See id. 
at 153-62; see also GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM 
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 605-63 (1944). 
233. See Ryan, supra note 9, at 255. 
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As for the historical implications of this evidence, it suggests that 
the NAACP's desegregation strategy was a sound one. This strategy 
was based on the principle of tying the fate of white and black students 
together in order to ensure that white legislators and school officials 
could not benefit white students without also benefiting black stu­
dents. Put more crudely, the strategy was based on the notion that 
green follows white, and that black students would receive more edu­
cational resources if placed in white schools.234 As it turned out, many 
minority districts were able to secure additional funding, while re­
maining racially isolated, through the device of Milliken II funding. 
This funding, however, is of course dependent on court order and will 
likely disappear when desegregation decrees are dismantled. 
The precarious financial position of Milliken II districts stands in 
sharp contrast to the relatively stable funding of the few integrated, 
metropolitan-wide school districts and their integrated or predomi­
nantly white urban counterparts. As for metropolitan-wide school dis­
tricts, Charlotte-Mecklenberg in North Carolina, Louisville-Jefferson 
County in Kentucky, and Nashville-Davidson County in Tennessee 
are three excellent examples of well-integrated school districts that 
encompass both central cities and surrounding suburbs.235 Not only do 
they spend above their statewide averages, even when adjusted for 
relevant costs, but their funding - save for a tiny portion of Char­
lotte-Mecklenberg's236 - is not dependent on desegregation decrees.237 
234. See id. at 258-59. 
235. Each of the districts is majority white. Charlotte-Mecklenberg is 46% minority; 
Louisville-Jefferson County is 33% minority; and Nashville-Davidson County is 45% mi­
nority. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 64-65. 
236. In 1993-94, Charlotte-Mecklenberg received $3.28 million from the federal gov­
ernment to help fund magnet programs. See Telephone Interview with John Dean, District 
Staff (June 30, 1998). There were between 87,000 and 93,000 students enrolled in the district 
that year, which works out to between $38 and $35 per student. See School District Data 
Book, supra note 75, at North Carolina, Mecklenberg (reporting that in 1989-90 the district 
enrolled approximately 87,000 students); Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 219 (reporting 
that in 1996 Charolotte-Mecklenberg had 93,000 students). This obviously does not explain 
the $300 per pupil that Charlotte-Mecklenberg spends above the state average. See Quality 
Counts, supra note 21, at 67. 
237. Louisville-Jefferson County spent roughly $500 over the state average in 1993-94, 
and Nashville-Davidson County spent roughly $550 over the state average. See Quality 
Counts, supra note 21, at 66-67. Las Vegas, which is in the Oark County school district, is 
another good example of the benefits of a metropolitan district, but also an illustration that 
such districts may face pressure from wealthier communities to split apart. See id. at 198-99. 
Las Vegas is 37% minority and in 1993-94 spent slightly less ($14 per pupil) than the state 
average when cost adjustments were made. See id. at 65, 67. Overall, Nevada has one of the 
most equitable financing systems in the country; indeed, a GAO report found that Nevada 
was the only state in which every district could make the average per-pupil expenditure with 
average tax effort. See SCHOOL FINANCE: STATE EFFORTS TO REDUCE F'UNDING GAPS 
BETWEEN POOR AND WEALTHY DISTRICTS, GAO/HEHS-97-13, at 16 (1997). The fairness 
of the school finance scheme in Nevada stems from the district configurations in the state: 
there are only 17 districts, all county-wide. That poor areas are helped by such districting is 
478 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:432 
What is more; these districts have relatively fewer impoverished stu­
dents than typical urban districts and thus do not face the difficulties 
caused by concentrated poverty.238 
As for urban districts, Salt Lake City, Portland (Oregon), and 
Albuquerque are all city-only districts, and all have fairly well­
integrated school systems.239 None receives desegregation funding. 
Both Salt Lake and Portland spent above their state averages in 1993-
94. Albuquerque spent slightly less, but the city is nonetheless still 
seen as the "powerhouse" of the state. The Legislature, moreover, re­
cently revamped the school financing policy to provide more funding 
to districts with at-risk students, which should benefit Albuquerque. 
As proof of Albuquerque's political strength, the Legislature made 
these changes to its school finance system despite the fact that a school 
finance challenge was unsuccessful in court. New Mexico's finance 
scheme is now considered to be one of the most equitable in the coun­
try.240 
These counter-examples of relatively well-funded, integrated dis­
tricts tend to vindicate the NAACP's desegregation strategy. The evi­
dence from these districts suggests that "tying" has worked, at least at 
the level of school funding. The poorest neighborhoods, and the 
poorest students, do appear to benefit from having their fates tied to 
the fates of wealthier neighborhoods and students. As others have 
noted, in metropolitan districts, "[t]he children of the most powerful 
and least powerful sectors of the community depend on the same large 
institution, and all races and classes have a vital interest in its sue-
perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that some wealthier communities are attempting to 
secede from school districts. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 201. 
238. Reports regarding each of the cities credit the merger of city and suburban districts 
for the relative good fortune of these school districts. The merger of Louisville with Jeffer­
son County, which occurred as a result of one of the rare, successful interdistrict desegrega­
tion cases, bolstered "what were at the time bankrupt and troubled downtown schools. If 
the Jefferson County and Louisville schools had stayed separate, Kentuckians say, the Lou­
isville school system would have the same, seemingly intractable problems found in urban 
systems in other states." Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 161. Similarly, the city of Char­
lotte's good fortune "is largely credited to its union with Mecklenberg County, with its 
wealthy subdivisions and its solid middle-class base." Id. at 220. The merger, according to 
those familiar with the system, "has meant equity of funding for urban and suburban schools 
alike and improved conditions for the poorest students. The combined system has also 
helped prevent the flight of affluent white residents from the urban center." Id.; see also 
Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80 
MINN. L. REV. 825 (1996). Likewise, the merger of Nashville schools with the surrounding 
schools in Davidson County provided Nashville access to the resources of the wealthiest 
county in Tennessee. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 245. 
239. Salt Lake has a surprising number of minority students - 30% - given that the 
entire public school enrollment is only 9% minority. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 65. 
Portland is 32% minority, in a state where public school enrollment is 14% minority. See id. 
Albuquerque has a majority (55%) of minority students, mostly Hispanic, in a state where 
public school enrollment has an even higher percentage of minority students (60% ). See id. 
240. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 208. 
November 1999] Race in School Finance Reform 479 
cess."241 In addition, allocation decisions in states with metropolitan 
districts do not pit central cities against suburbs but instead feature a 
unified metropolitan area seeking resources with one voice.242 Given 
the balance of power in many state legislatures, where suburban leg­
islators dominate, this different political dynamic and the coalition be­
tween suburb and city seem crucial and undoubtedly explain why the 
funding in metropolitan districts seems on surer footing than does the 
funding in predominantly minority, urban districts. For the latter, re­
liance on the courts, either for desegregation funding or school finance 
reform, is often seen as the only alternative. As this Article reveals, 
however, such reliance has led to fleeting relief in the desegregation 
context and even less in the school finance context. 
Finally, from a practical perspective, the evidence presented here 
indicates that school finance reform is not a perfect substitute for de­
segregation. As mentioned earlier, support for school desegregation 
appears to be on the wane among blacks and whites, liberals and con­
servatives. More and more, courts, advocates, and academics alike as­
sert that desegregation is not the answer, and that poor, urban minor­
ity schools will succeed if given more resources to adopt one of several 
popular educational reforms.243 The current, conventional wisdom, in 
short, is that reform efforts should be directed solely at improving the 
education that minority students receive, regardless of whether those 
students are in integrated or segregated schools.244 
241. Orfield, supra note 238, at 834. See generally James S. Liebman, Desegregating 
Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1990). 
242. See Orfield, supra note 238, at 836. 
243. The three reforms that are currently in fashion, and which overlap to a certain ex­
tent, are standards-based reform, whole-school or systemic reform, and site-based manage­
ment. See, e.g., JEAN ANYON, GHETIO SCHOOLING: A PoLmCAL ECONOMY OF URBAN 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 9-12 (1997) (describing scope of current reforms and history of 
earlier waves of reform); ALLAN ODDEN & CAROLYN BUSCH, FINANCING SCHOOLS FOR 
HIGH PERFORMANCE: STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE USE OF EDUCATIONAL 
REsOURCES (1998); Olatokunbo S. Fashola & Robert E. Slavin, Schoolwide Reform Models: 
What Works?, 19 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 370 (1998) (describing whole-school reform pro­
grams); James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the 90s: Political Reconstruction, Liberal 
Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 16 VA. L. REV. 349, 371-78 
(1990) (describing standards movement); Kenneth K. Wong et al., Prospects: Special Analy­
ses, prepared for the U.S. Department of Education (1996). The precursor to today's re­
forms was the "effective schools" movement, which sought to identify the most essential 
traits - such as effective leadership and strong teacher preparation - of productive and 
successful schools. See, e.g., Stewart C. Purkey & Marshall S. Smith, Effective Schools: A 
Review, 83 ELEMENTARY. SCH. J. 427 (1983). 
244. See, e.g., WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 53, at 336. In their case study of the St. Louis 
desegregation plan, which sends thousands of minority students from the city to suburban 
schools, Wells and Crain report that "[t]ime and time again educators, policy makers, par­
ents, students, and 'people on the streets' of metropolitan St. Louis told us that the millions 
of dollars the state pays to bring nearly 13,000 African-American students to suburban 
schools would be better spent 'fixing up' the city schools." Id.; see also STEVE FARKAS & 
JEAN JOHNSON, TIME TO MOVE ON: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND WHITE PARENTS SET AN 
AGENDA FOR PuBLIC SCHOOLS 10 (1998) (reporting results of survey conducted by Public 
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I would like to suggest that it is not as easy as the conventional 
wisdom would suggest to separate the racial composition of a school 
district and the district's chances of receiving sufficient resources to 
support educational reform. I interpret the evidence collected in this 
Article as demonstrating that as long as race affects the decisionmak­
ing of courts or legislatures, the racial make-up of school districts \vill 
continue to affect decisions regarding school funding. This reality has 
been absent from the debate about abandoning integration as a goal in 
education reform. It deserves to be included and seriously considered, 
particularly by those who advocate the creation or maintenance of 
single-race schools.245 
I have argued elsewhere that it would be unwise as a matter of 
education policy to abandon integration, given the demonstrable 
benefits of integration and the dearth of evidence indicating that in­
creasing expenditures in racially isolated schools is academically effi­
cacious.246 This Article poses something of an argument in the alterna­
tive, in an effort to demonstrate that it may also be unwise, from a 
financial perspective, to abandon integration. In other words, even if 
increasing expenditures in urban minority schools would enable them 
to provide an education comparable to that provided in the average 
suburban district (a scenario I find implausible), we are still left with 
the question: What is the likelihood that minority schools will receive 
funds sufficient to carry out this task? Based on the evidence dis­
cussed above, the answer is not encouraging: many minority districts 
are going to lose their Milliken II funding in the near future, and the 
prospects of using school finance litigation to maintain or increase cur­
rent expenditure levels appears dim. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the past difficulties with and current opposition to manda­
tory school desegregation, it is perhaps not surprising that integration 
is rarely mentioned these days by academics, school officials, or legis­
lators as a worthwhile goal in education reform. Indeed, even the re­
cent Presidential Commission on Race explicitly recognized the value 
of a racially diverse student body but, remarkably, failed to include in-
Agenda and the Public Education Network, which indicated that African-American parents, 
by an 80% to 9% margin, "say the higher priority for the nation's schools should be to raise 
academic standards and achievement rather than focus on achieving more diversity and inte­
gration"). 
245. See generally DERRICK BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE 
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown and the Interest­
Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION 
(Derrick A. Bell, ed. 1980); Alex Johnson Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: 
Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1401 (1993). 
246. See Ryan, supra note 9, at 286-304. 
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creasing integration as an explicit goal for the future.247 In light of the 
current political mood, it is also understandable that those sincerely 
interested in improving the educational opportunities of poor minority 
students would look to alternative reforms, which do not strive to in­
crease racial or socioeconomic integration. 
I suggest that the evidence presented in this Article should be 
something of an alarm bell to those pursuing these alternative paths, 
and that it should prod advocates and academics to reconsider, if not 
redouble, efforts to increase integration. Not only does integration 
carry with it educational benefits that school finance reform fails to 
provide, 248 it also appears to carry with it financial benefits and finan­
cial stability that school finance litigation has been unable to deliver to 
predominantly minority districts. Support for this assertion, again, is 
found in contrasting the financial instability of Milliken II districts 
with the relatively ample and stable funding of integrated city and 
metropolitan districts. Thus, even if one believes that minority stu­
dents need money rather than more integration in order to improve 
their achievement, integration - unlike school finance litigation - is 
a demonstrably effective means of securing resources for poor minor­
ity students. Continued or increased racial isolation, by contrast, 
seems an especially poor financial strategy. 
This is not to suggest that the public can be persuaded suddenly to 
accept busing and mandatory integration among urban and suburban 
schools. Rather, it is to suggest that, at the very least, the goal of inte­
gration must be decoupled from prior unsuccessful efforts to desegre­
gate schools. For too long, integration and mandatory busing have 
been inextricably linked, such that public displeasure with the latter 
has tainted the perception of the former. The goal of integration, 
however, is quite distinct from the means of achieving it. Even if the 
traditional means of achieving integration must be abandoned, it does 
not follow that the goal itself must be abandoned. On the contrary, 
this Article suggests that our search should be for alternative methods 
to increase integration, not for an alternative goal.249 
247. See THE ADVISORY BOARD TO TIIE PREsIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S IN!TIATIVE ON 
RACE, ONE AMERICA IN TIIE 21ST CENTURY (Sept. 1998). 
248. See Ryan, supra note 9, at 301-07. 
249. For suggestions on two possible strategies for increasing racial and socioeconomic 
integration, see Ryan, supra note 9, at 307-15, and James E. Ryan, She� Segregation, and 
School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529 (1999). 
